The features that characterize normal personality styles

The features that characterize normal personality styles

1 Motivating styles are most closely akin to concepts such as need, drive, affect, and emotion in that they pertain to the strivings and goals that spur and guide the organism; that is, the purposes and ends that stir them into one or another course of behavior. The aims of motivation refl ect strivings for survival, which I see as composed of three elements, those I have referred to previously as “existence,” “adaptation,” and “replication” (Millon, 1990). In a manner akin to Freud (1915), these three elements are organized as bipolarities, each of which comprise two contrasting scales. At one extreme of the fi rst bipolarity is a motivation-based scale pertaining to the existential aim of strengthening one’s life or reinforcing one’s capacity to survive (phrased as pleasure-enhancing); at the other extreme is an emotion-based scale that refl ects the need to protect one’s survival against lifethreatening events (referred to as pain-avoiding). The second of the motivating aim bipolarities relates to adaptation, that is, methods by which one operates in one’s environment to enhance and preserve life. One end of this bipolarity represents tendencies to actively and energetically alter the conditions of one’s life, (termed actively modifying); the other end represents the inclination to passively accept in a neutral and nonresponsive manner ones’ life circumstances as they are given (referred to as passively accommodating). The third bipolarity comprising the motivating domain also differentiates two scales; one scale represents those who seek to realize and fulfi ll their own potentials before those of others (spoken of as self-indulging), as contrasted to those who are disposed to value the fortunes and potentials of relatives and companions to a greater degree than their own (called other-nurturing).

2 The second group of bipolarity scales relates to thinking styles, incorporating both the sources employed to gather knowledge about life, and the manner in which this information is transformed. In a manner akin to Jung (1923), four bipolarities, the constructs they reflect, and the eight scales developed to represent them comprise this section of the MIPS. Here we are looking at contrasting “modes of cognizing”, differences among people, first, in what they attend to in order to experience and learn about life and, second, what they habitually do to make this knowledge meaningful and useful to themselves. The first two of these bipolarities refer to the information sources to which attention and perception are drawn to provide cognitions. One pair of scales contrasts individuals who are disposed to look outward or external-to-self for information, inspiration, and guidance (termed externally focused ), versus those inclined to turn inward or internal-to-self (referred to as internally focused ). The second pair of scales contrasts predilections for direct observational experiences of a tangible, material, and concrete nature (labeled realistic-sensing) with those geared more toward inferences regarding phenomena of an intangible, ambiguous, symbolic, and abstract character (named imaginative-intuiting). The second set of thinking style bipolarities relate to processes of transformation; that is, ways inwhich information and experiences, once apprehended and incorporated, are subsequently evaluated and reconstructed mentally. The fi rst pair of the transformation scales differentiates processes based essentially on intellect, logic, reason, and objectivity (entitled thought-guided ) from those which depend on affective empathy, personal values, sentiment, and subjectivity (designated feeling-guided ). The second of the transformational scales are likewise divided into a bipolar pairing. At one end are reconstruction modes that transform new information so as to make it assimilate to preconceived formal, tradition-bound, well-standardized, and conventionally structured schemas (called conservationseeking); at the other bipolar scale are represented inclinations to avoid cognitive preconceptions, to distance from what is already known and to originate new ideas in an informal, open-minded, spontaneous, individualistic, and often imaginative manner (termed innovation-seeking).

3 The third group of bipolar scales represents behaving styles, reflecting how individuals prefer to relate to and conduct their transactions with others. These styles of social behavior derive in part from the interplay of the person’s distinctive pattern of motivating styles and thinking styles. Five bipolarities have been constructed to represent contrasting styles of interpersonal behaviors; in a broader context these styles of behavior may be considered to be located at the normal end of a spectrum continuum that shades progressively into the more problematic or abnormal personality disorders recorded in the DSM, Axis II. The fi rst pair of scales in this, the third section of MIPS-R, pertains to a bipolar dimension characterized by contrasting degrees of sociability. At one bipolar end are those persons whose high scale scores suggest that they relate to others in a socially distant, disengaged, affectless, and coolly indifferent manner (termed asocialwithdrawing); on the other high scale end are those who seek to be engaged, are lively, talkative, and actively engaged interpersonally (called gregarious-outgoing). The second polarity pair relates to ones’ comfort and poise in social settings; it contrasts those who tend to be uncertain and fearful, are unsure of their personal worth, and are inclined to feel insecure and to withdraw socially (named anxious–hesitating), with those who are socially comfortable and self-possessed, as well as bold and decisive in their relationships (entitled confi dent-asserting). The third pairing relates to contrasting degrees of conventionality and social deference; it differentiates those who are disinclined more than most to adhere to public standards, cultural mores, and organizational regulations, act autonomously and insist on functioning socially on their own terms (labeled unconventionaldissenting), as compared to those who are notably tradition-bound, socially compliant and responsible, respectful of authority, as well as appropriately diligent and reliable (termed dutiful-conforming). Facets of the interpersonal dimension of dominance–submission are tapped in the fourth polarity. High on one polar scale are those who are not only docile but also self-demeaning, diffi dent, overly modest, and self-depriving (designated submissive-yielding), as compared to those who, beyond being overbearing and arrogant, are also willful, ambitious, forceful, and power-seeking (termed dominant-controlling). The fi fth and fi nal set of polarities pertains to features of a dimension of social negativism versus social congeniality. The former is seen among those who are dissatisfi ed with both themselves and others, who are generally displeased with the status quo, and tend to be resentfuland oppositional (designated dissatisfi ed- complaining); they contrast with those who are helpful and compromising, not only considerate of others, but also highly obliging, and willingly adapting their behaviors to accord with the wishes of others (named cooperative-agreeing). As noted, scales refl ecting several “character styles” associated with constructive and positive orientations will be added to the forthcoming revision of the MIPS.

Assessment (Normal personality and Abnormal Personality)

Assessment (Normal personality and Abnormal Personality)

Instruments exist to assess whether persons are clinically problematic in one or another combination of polarity extremes. Best known among these is the MCMI (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, either versions I, II, or III) or the forthcoming MCMI-III; 2nd edition, 2006 (see Grossman & del Rio, 2005). Recent instruments geared to the theoretical model, but focused essentially on nonclinical or normal populations, have also been published. The Personality Adjective Check List (PACL) (Strack, 1987) was the fi rst and most direct form of these tools. More recent is the Millon Index of Personality Styles (MIPS-R), developed by the authors and their associates (Millon, Davis, & Weiss, 1993; Millon, Millon, & Weiss, 2003).
Abnormally Oriented Clinical Instruments
The initial tools developed on the basis of the evolutionary model were oriented primarily
to assess abnormal personality, termed disorders in the DSM, although other clinical syndromes were appraised by these instruments as well. Three initial diagnostic inventories instruments were constructed and published, the MCMI (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory), the MBHI (Millon Behavioral Health Inventory), updated a short time ago as the MBMD (Millon Behavioral Medicine Diagnositc) and the MAPI (Millon Adolescent Personality Inventory), replaced in recent years with the MACI (Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory).

MCMI
A 175-item true–false self-report inventory, the MCMI and its subsequent revisions, MCMI-II (Millon, 1987), MCMI-III (Millon, 1994), and MCMI-III, 2nd edition, 2006, (Millon, in press) include 14 abnormal personality scales [all of the personality disorders included in the main texts and appendices of the DSM-III, III-R, and IV; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1980, 1987, 1994)], nine clinical syndrome scales, as well as three “modifying indices” to appraise problematic response tendencies. Within the restrictions on validity set by the limits of the self-report mode, the narrow frontiers of psychometric technology, as well as the slender range of consensually shared diagnostic knowledge, all steps were taken to maximize the MCMIs concordance with its generative theory and the offi cial classifi cation system. Pragmatic and philosophical compromises were made where valued objectives could not be simultaneously achieved (e.g., instrument brevity versus item independence; representative national patient norms versus local base rate specifi city; theoretical criterion considerations versus empirical data).A major goal in constructing the MCMI was to keep the total number of items comprising the inventory small enough to encourage use in all types of diagnostic and treatment settings, yet large enough to permit the assessment of a wide range of clinically relevant behaviors. At 175 items, the fi nal form is much shorter than comparable instruments. Potentially objectionable statements were screened out, and terminology was geared to an eighth-grade reading level. As a result, the great majority of patients can complete the MCMI in 20–30 minutes. Unfortunately, as many have noted (Butcher, 1972), assessment techniques and personality theorizing have developed almost independently. As a result, few diagnostic measures either have been based on or have evolved from clinical theory. The MCMI is different. Each of its personality disorder and clinical syndrome scales was constructed as an operational measure of a syndrome derived from a theory of personality and psychopathology (Millon, 1969, 1981, 1990).
No less important than its link to theory is an instrument’s coordination with the offi cial diagnostic system and its syndromal categories. With the advent of the various recent DSMs (APA, 1980, 1987, 1994), diagnostic categories and labels have been precisely
specified and defined operationally. Few diagnostic instruments currently available are as consonant with the nosological format and conceptual terminology of this official system as the MCMI. Separate scales of the MCMI have been constructed in line with the DSM to distinguish the more enduring personality characteristics of patients (Axis II) from the acute clinical disorders they display (Axis I), a distinction judged to be of considerable use by both test developers and clinicians (Dahlstrom, 1972). This distinction should enable the clinician to separate those syndrome features of psychopathological functioning that are persistent and pervasive from those that are transient or circumscribed. Moreover, profiles based on all 23 clinical scales illuminate the interplay between long-standing characterological patterns and the distinctive clinical symptomatology a patient manifests under psychic stress.
Similarly, it seemed useful to construct scales that distinguish syndromes in terms of their levels of psychopathological severity. For example, the premorbid personality pattern of a patient is assessed independently of its degree of pathology. To achieve this in the recently published MCMI-III (see Figures 1.1–1.3), separate scales are used to determine the style of traits comprising the basic personality structure (Scales 1-8B) and the greater level of pathology of that structure (Scales S, B M1, M2 and P). In like manner, moderately severe clinical syndromes (Scales A, H, D, B, and T), notably those referred to traditionally as “neurotic,” are separated and independently assessed from those with parallel features but more of a so-called “psychotic” nature (Scales SS, CC, and PP).
Worthy of note in the just published MCMI-III, 2nd edtition, is the inclusion of facet scales designed to identify and measure several of the functional and structural personological domains cross-validation data gathered with nondevelopment samples supported the measure’s generalizability, dependability, and accuracy of diagnostic scale cutting lines and profi le interpretations. Large and diverse samples have been studied with the MCMI, but it is still necessary to achieve full domain coverage in ongoing cross-validation studies. Local base rates and cutting lines may continue to be developed for special settings. Nevertheless, validation data with a variety of populations (e.g., outpatients andinpatients; alcohol and drug centers) suggest that the various forms of the CMI can be used with a reasonable level of confi dence in most clinical settings. The MCMI is not a general personality instrument to be used for normal populations or for purposes other than diagnostic screening or clinical assessment. Hence, it contrasts with other, more broadly applied, inventories whose presumed utility for diverse populations is often highly questionable. Normative data and transformation scores for the MCMI are based on presumed clinical samples and are applicable therefore only to persons who evince psychological symptoms or are engaged in a program of professional psychotherapy or psychodiagnostic evaluation. As should be noted, there are distinct boundaries to the accuracy of the self-report method of clinical data collection; by no means is it a perfect data source. The inherent psychometric limits of the tools, the tendency of similar patients to interpret questions differently, the effect of current affective states on trait measures, the effort of patients to effect certain false appearances and impression, all narrow the upper boundaries of this method’s potential accuracy. However, by constructing a self-report instrument in line with accepted techniques of validation (Loevinger, 1957), an inventory should begin to approach these upper boundaries.

MBMD
In a manner similar to the various MCMI forms, these instruments are best employed with persons also being seen in a clinical or medical setting. In this regard, they differ from the PACL and the MIPS-R, to be discussed shortly. Let us briefl y describe the Millon Behavioral Medicine Diagnostic (MBMD:Millon, Antoni, Millon, Meagher, & Grossman, 2001) fi rst. MBMD. Using psychiatrically oriented psychological tests in settings primarily of a medical nature requires that their concepts and indices be translated to fi t new populations and purposes. Medical populations are not psychiatric populations, and viewing patients within traditional mental health constructs may prove neither valid nor useful. Of course, standard techniques can provide general information, such as levels of emotional health, or the presence of distinctive symptoms, such as depression or anxiety. Problems arise, however, because of the unsuitability of norms, the questionable relevance of clinical signs, and the consequent inapplicability of interpretations. In brief, a “standard” interpretation of results obtained with a medical sample on a diagnostic test developed on and designed to assess a psychiatric population may not characterize sound test use. MBHI. Developed in 1979, the MBHI was replaced by the Millon Behavior Medicine Diagnostic (MBMD) in 2001. Both were developed specifi cally with physically ill patients and medical–behavioral decision-making issues in mind. Brevity, clarity, and ease of administration were added to the goal of elucidating salient and relevant dimensions of functioning. The MBMD includes a series of negative health habit indicators (e.g., smoking) and several psychiatric indicators (e.g., depression). Also, 11 basic coping styles scales are included, each derived from the evolutionary theory of personality (1969, 1974, 1981, 1990, 1996). Other scales were developed additionally to refl ect stress moderators found in the research literature to be signifi cant precipitators or exacerbators of physical illness. A fi nal group of treatment prognostic scales were derived either to appraise the extent towhich emotional factors are likely to complicate therapeutic efforts and to predict psychological complications associated with such efforts. All items were selected with data comparing groups of general medical populations or differentiating among subgroups of patients. This shift to a general medical reference population, rather than the usual psychiatric comparison groups, was expected to optimize the discrimination efficiency of the scales; the assumption that these steps should heighten diagnostic accuracy was supported by cross-validation evidence. MAPI, MACI, and M-PACI. A variety of psychological tests have been developed through the years for use with adolescents and preadolescents. Often constructed in accord with the sophistication then available, their shortcomings are now evident as psychometric advances have taken place. Although these older instruments provide useful information, they tend not to be tuned to current issues and behaviors, and lack a theoretically grounded system of personality traits that can integrate the diverse features salient to the teen years. The Millon Adolescent Personality Inventory (Millon,
Green, & Meagher, 1982), also known as the MAPI, was normed on both abnormal (seen in clinical settings) and normal (seen in school and church settings) teenagers. The Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (Millon, Millon, & Davis, 1993) was based on 13–19-year old abnormal adolescents only, and developed to quantify relationships between traits and clinical states. The M-PACI or Millon PreAdolescent Clinical Inventory was designed as a self-report tool for youngsters between 9 and 12 years of age (Millon, Tringone, Millon & Grossman, 2005). The items that comprise these inventories were drafted in a language that teenagers and preteenagers use; they deal with matters teens can understand and fi nd relevant to their concerns and experiences. The most elegantly constructed psychometric tool is not likely to be widely accepted if its content, length, and linguistic style make it unwieldy. A major goal for the MAPI, MACI, and M-PACI was to construct inventories with enough items to assess and illuminate accurately a variety of personality traits, psychological concerns, and clinically relevant behaviors, yet be of suffi cient brevity to encourage its use in a variety of outpatient and residential settings. Both reading level and vocabulary were set to allow for ready comprehension by the vast majority of youngsters. The fi nal 160-item MACI inventory, geared to the sixth-grade reading level and the 97-item M-PACI test, geared to the third-grade level, can be completed by most youngsters in less than 20 minutes. The brevity and clarity of the instrument facilitates rapid administration with a minimum of client resistance.
Counselors, clinical psychologists, and psychiatrists were involved with the M-PACI and MACI throughout all phases of their development. At an early stage, clinicians were interviewed to ascertain issues relevant to both typical and troubled adolescents. The M-PACI has seven “emerging personality” scales and seven “clinical syndrome” scales. The MACI includes 12 personality scales that seek to parallel the DSM-IV disorders. It also possesses eight “expressed concern” scales that address the attitudes teenagers have regarding signifi cant developmental problems. In addition, there are seven clinical syndrome scales that refl ect major diagnostic categories associated with behaviors and thoughts that may pose serious diffi culties for the adolescent (e.g., suicide ideation, substance abuse). The capacity to differentiate each of the various clinical problem areas is a key to the effectiveness of the inventory. Hence, MACI item selections were made by comparing the targeted criterion group with a general, but troubled adolescent population. The use of reference groups such as these should substantially increase diagnostic discrimination efficiency. The M-PACI items were selected following substantial evidence of their correlation with clinician judgments of psychologists well-acquainted with their psychological problems.

Normality-Oriented Personality Instruments
As noted, the fi rst group of instruments generated by the theoretical model focused on abnormality and clinical diagnosis. As the theory was broadened to encompass personality traits and characteristics that fell within the so-called normal range (Millon, 1991), attention was directed to the development of suitability coordinated nonclinical assessment tools. Two such instruments have been constructed in line with this goal— the PACL (Strack, 1987), and the Millon Index of Personality Styles and its revision (Millon, 2004; Millon, Millon, & Davis, 1993). PACL. The fi rst instrument specifi cally designed to assess the theoretically derived personality types in a normal population was developed by a graduate research group led by the senior author in the early 1980s. As the project progressed through its early revisions, the major responsibility for its further development was undertaken by one of its members, Stephen Strack. Using the adjective checklist format, the initial forms (both clinician-rated and self-reported) were composed of 405 items that were intended to refl ect the theory’s original basic personality types and its three more severe personality variants.
Item refi nements and initial validation studies were based on data from over 2000 normal adults from a variety of diverse national settings. A wide range of validity data have been gathered and reported (Strack, 1987, 1991), including correlations with various
other gauges of personality and biographic data on current and past behavior. Each scale of the PACL appears consonant with theoretical expectations and their expected personality characterizations. Thus, the PACL Inhibited scale (which refl ects a milder variant of the theory’s active-detached pattern and the DSM’s avoidant personality disorder) is positively correlated with measures of shyness, submissiveness, and social anxiety, although being negatively correlated with measure of sociability, dominance, and emotional well-being. Similarly, the PACL Forceful scale (a milder version of the theory’s and DSM’s antisocial and sadistic disorders) is positively related to gauges of aggressiveness, arrogance, dominance, and negatively related to gauges of deference, submissiveness, and conscientiousness. Owing to the common linkage in theory there is a possibility that the results of the PACL might be erroneously confused with parallel revisions of the MCMI. High scores on the PACL scales do not signify the presence of personality disorders, as they do on the MCMI; rather, they suggest the presence of distinctive personality traits. As Strack (1991) notes, all persons in the PACL development group were presumed to have normal personalities, hence the special utility of the instrument as a measure of normality rather than abnormality.

MIPS-R.
This is a self-report inventory composed of sentence-length items rather than an adjective checklist, as is the PACL. Both are anchored to the theoretical modelformulated by Millon from the mid-1960s to the early 2000s. However, the PACL, as with the MCMI, focused its scales on personality types as a composite or whole, be they normal (PACL) or abnormal (MCMI). In contrast, the MIPS-R focuses on the constructs that underlie these personality types, the latent components that combine to give rise to them. To illustrate: The histrionic personality disorder (MCMI), termed “sociable” personality style (PACL), are the manifest abnormal and normal personality forms that take shape among those who are latently “active” on the active–passive polarity, and oriented to other on the self–other polarity. Focusing on these latent components, the first set of scales of the MIPS measure the three polarity pairs of the theory directly (e.g. pleasure–pain, active–passive, and self–other), rather than the manifest forms into which various combinations of these are exhibited.
Beyond breaking down the theory’s manifest personality types into their constituent latent constructs, the theory, as described in previous pages, has been expanded substantially. Whereas the three polarities of the theory are still considered crucial elements of the model and serve as a particularly important gauge of personality abnormality, they are now judged to be insuffi cient as a comprehensive scaffold for encompassing the highly diverse styles of normal personality. This is not the chapter to elaborate both the full rationale and specifi cs of the expanded model; recent essays on this theme may be found in the MIPS or MIPS-R manuals (Millon, Millon, Davis, & Weiss, 1993; Millon, Millon, & Weiss, 2003).
Briefl y, we should note that cognitive differences among individuals and the manner in which they are expressed have not been a suffi ciently appreciated domain for generating personality traits. We have added a set of four polarities that refl ect different “thinking styles” to the MIPS and MIPS-R. These follow the initial three polarities (e.g., self-other), which have been termed as “motivating styles.” Similarly, we have added a third domain of polarities to those of “motivation” and “cognition,” that are termed as “behaving styles.” We share the view of many who give the manifest forms of the interpersonal dimension a degree of centrality in their personality gauges; in fact, we do judge them no less signifi cant than either motivation or thinking styles, especially if they
are organized in terms of the latent polarities they express. Thus, a third domain, comprising fi ve interpersonal behavior polarities, concludes the MIPS-R test form, although work has begun on the inclusion of “character styles” to further advance the utility of the instrument in identifying positive and healthy orientations.
The following précis of the tripartite structure of the MIPS scales divides the test in the manner in which organisms function in their environment, one which we believe may be a useful theory-based schema for purposes of normal personological analysis. As noted previously, we have termed the fi rst segment in this tripartite sequence as motivating styles, to signify that the behaviors of organisms are prompted, energized, and directed by particular purposes and goals they wish to achieve. The second component of the sequence is labeled thinking styles to indicate the manner in which human organisms seek out, regulate, internalize, and transform information about their environment and themselves, a step necessary if organisms are to achieve their aims effectively. The third segment in the sequence is referred to as behaving styles to represent the different ways in which human organisms relate to and negotiate with other humans in their social environment in light of the aims that motivate them and the cognitions they have formed. To capture personality more-or-less fully we must fi nd ways to characterize all three components of the sequence: the deeper motives which orientindividuals, the characteristic sources they utilize to construct and to transform their cognitions, and the particular behaviors they have learned to relate to others interpersonally.

Millon’s Evolutionary Model for Normal and Abnormal Personality

Millon’s Evolutionary Model for Normal and Abnormal Personality

This is a time of rapid scientific and clinical advancement, a time that seems propitious for ventures designed to bridge new ideas and syntheses. The intersection between the study of “psychopathology” and the study of “personality” is one of these spheres of significant intellectual activity and clinical responsibility. Theoretical formulations that bridge this intersection would represent a major and valued conceptual step, but to limit efforts to this junction alone will lead to overlooking the solid footings necessary for fundamental progress, and which are provided increasingly by more mature sciences (e.g., physics and evolutionary biology). By failing to coordinate propositions and constructs to principles and laws established in these advanced disciplines, psychological science will continue to float, so to speak, at its current level, an act that will ensure the need to return to this task another day. The goal is to connect the conceptual structure of personology to its foundations in the natural sciences. What is proposed herein is a kind to Freud’s (1895) abandoned Project for a Scientific Psychology and Wilson’s (1975) highly controversial Sociobiology. Both were worthy endeavors to advance our understanding of human nature; this was to be done by exploring interconnections among disciplines that evolved ostensibly unrelated bodies of research and manifestly dissimilar languages. It is necessary, we believe, to go beyond current conceptual boundaries in psychology, more specifically to explore carefully reasoned, as well as “intuitive” hypotheses that draw their principles, if not their substance, from more established, “adjacent” sciences. Not only may such steps bear new conceptual fruits, but also they may provide a foundation that can undergird and guide our own discipline’sexplorations. Much of personology, no less psychology as a whole, remains drift,divorced from broader spheres of scientifi c knowledge, isolated from fi rmly grounded, if not universal principles, leading one to continue building the patchwork quilt of concepts and data domains that characterize the fi eld. Preoccupied with but a small part of the larger puzzle, or fearing accusations of reductionism, many fail thereby to draw on the rich possibilities to be found in other realms of scholarly pursuit. With few exceptions, cohering concepts that would connect this subject to those of its sister sciences have not been developed.
Despite the shortcomings of historic and contemporary theoretical schemas of most sciences, systematizing principles and abstract concepts can “facilitate a deeper seeing, a more penetrating vision that goes beyond superficial appearances to the order underlying them” (Bowers, 1977). For example, pre-Darwinian taxonomists such as Linnaeus limited themselves to “apparent” similarities and differences among animals as a means of constructing their categories. Darwin was not “seduced” by appearances. Rather, he sought to understand the principles by which overt features came about. His classifi cations were based not only on descriptive qualities but also on explanatory ones. Task in the evolutionary model to be that of peeling back the manifest character of the observable personological and clinical world of overt behaviors, thoughts, and emotions, to jettison its veneer, and to expose its latent or underlying functions. In discover and articulate a set of coherent principles and procedures that may advance and facilitate our understanding and assessment of both normal and abnormal subject domains. Some have said that our evolutionary model seeks “to read the mind of God” rather acquire a somewhat less presumptuous characterization, that of seeking “to read the mind of human nature.” A unifying model for personology and psychopathology must coalesce the field’s disparate schools of thought, not, however, in a haphazard way that simply identifies the alternatives or records their separate contributions, but in a manner that truly integrates each of these seemingly contradictory perspectives at a “deeper level,” that is, one that synthesizes the alternative components intrinsically. Although, random, eclectic, or broad-based theories have, as their benefit, the advantages of open-mindedness and comprehensiveness, they are likely to be generative of little more than providing a measure of illusory psychic comfort. A substantively unifying paradigm will interweave fundamental relationships that exist among the cognitive, biological, intrapsychic, and behavioral components that are inherent in the person. This will, in effect, generate integrative theoretical and assessment strategies. This desirable advantage has been achieved partially in psychotherapy by efforts to employ combinatorial treatment approaches (e.g., CBT, pharmacological/family interventions). However, even more synergy is possible and desirable. A unifi ed paradigm for the science of normal and abnormal personology must be based conceptually and pragmatically on interweaving the “whole person.”
It may be a useful digression to refer to scientific developments of t his character in other person- and treatment-oriented fields. Medicine, for example, has recently begun to focus on matters beyond surface symptomatology. Diseases in the past were “understood” and named only in accord with their overtly observable qualities (e.g., smallpox), in much the same way as we now refer to psychiatric entities such as “dysthymia” or “anxiety.” Late in the 19th century, a paradigm shift occurred when biologists andphysicians recognized that unseen “infectious agents” were central to the etiology and understanding of disease manifestation. Symptom-labeled entities such as “smallpox” were no longer to be approached with superficial palliatives (e.g., bloodletting), but as infiltrating microbial agents in otherwise healthy individuals and, as further technical knowledge advanced, to be treated at their roots with appropriately targeted antibiotics.
An additional conceptual development in medical science occurred this past quarter of a century in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Never before had the immune system been known to play so vital a role in differentiating normal versus abnormal functioning. It has been illustrated recently, for example, that constitutional differences exist among individuals in their susceptibility to the immunodefi ciency virus; some are resistant to its effects whereas others will succumb to full-blown AIDS. Here again we may draw a parallel to our personological model from our sister science of medicine. Personality disorders may be seen as representing different vulnerabilities in people’s “psychic immune system,” that is, defects or defi ciencies in a person’s longstanding pattern of perceiving and coping with the psychic stressors in his or her mental life. The different personality disorders are signs of different psychic vulnerabilities. The task of personologists is to decode (diagnose) these vulnerabilities on the basis of a patient’s symptoms, and then engage in therapy that not only removes the symptoms but also works through the individual’s underlying vulnerabilities. Assessing and understanding the vulnerabilities—the patient’s weakened intrapsychic defenses, neurochemical imbalances, cognitive misinterpretations, and interpersonal diffi culties—will enable us to take steps to effect, with all these domains of vulnerability in focus, a synergisitic and “personalized therapy.”
The desire for and potential in personological unifi cation calls for at least one additional consideration. Again, the parallel between medicine and personology points to an issue often alluded to, but rarely addressed directly: On what basis should a unifying paradigm of a “personality” science be grounded? In our view, all basic or applied sciences (physics, engineering, personology) are expressions of common functions grounded and understood from the conceptual principles of evolution theory. All disciplines of science, once achieving suffi cient maturity, are natural outgrowths of, as well as demonstrations of, the operation of evolutionary processes. Formally structured, each of these sciences is composed of subject-relevant theories (e.g., particle physics, personology), component classified taxonomies (e.g., synaptic neurochemicals, International Classification of Diseases), operational measuring tools (e.g., cyclotrons, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI]), and, when required, efficacious instruments of effecting change (e.g., locomotives, cognitive therapy). As we see it, only when all four of the preceding elements that provide a structure to a science are articulated and coordinated can our assessment tools and our therapeutic techniques demonstrate or achieve full empirical validity and instrumental efficacy. Unfortunately, most of our theories and studies have existed largely as independent and often contradictory approaches to a modestly formed science; that is, they have little to no relationship to the assessment measures we employ to identify interventional targets, nor do they stem from explanatory principles of theories employed to understand the individuals who seek our clinical efforts. We lack the means found in subjects such as physics where physicists possess the ability to apply the equations of theory to their taxonomy of elementary particles and possess measurement instruments that can test whether theoretically generated properties exist in fact. It is our belief that we are reaching a time when we can begin to systematize our knowledge of personology in a manner akin to more advanced sciences. Specifically, it is our judgment that we would do well to employ the universal principles of evolutionary theory to guide our understanding of the properties of human functioning, that is, to enable us to formulate theoretical propositions that “explain” our subject domain. These principles should also enable us to construct a taxonomic system that is derived from such a theory, which, in turn, will facilitate the development of assessment tools that identify properties composing the taxonomy, and then point to those clinical characteristics that should serve as therapeutic targets. In effect, a unified personological
paradigm such as this will serve as an ever-present guide as to where, how, and which assessment tools and interventions are best employed. A few words should be said at the outset outlining the logic and steps we will follow as we proceed in this chapter. First, let us note that the ontological position of the personality prototypes is unchanging and invariant. They are derived by a series of direct and simple deductions from the evolutionary model, resting on what we believe to be the three fundamental and indispensable essentials of life: “existential survival” (pleasure/pain), ecological adaptation (active/passive), and species replication (propagation/nurturance). As an inevitable deduction, the several derived personality prototypes are the fi nal word, real and defi nitive, given that they neither change nor can be altered by the impact of such extrascientifi c conditions as social or political considerations. That the prevalence of prototypal personalities can and will vary as a function of cultural infl uences is both possible and expected, but their enduring and inextinguishable character, as derived from
the essentials of evolution, is immutable. Second, what is variable are what we refer to as personality subtypes. Personality subtypes are essentially combinations of the several immutable prototypes. The subtypes are not derived directly from the imperatives of evolution’s processes. They take shape as the adventitious impact of life’s experiences generate admixtures of composites of the prototypes, compounds, and blendings that result from the infl uence of familial and cultural forces. Also among these mosaic amalgamations are subtype variants that differ in their degree of “normality or abnormality.” Thus, the exigencies of evolution can sequentially and ultimately generate, in interaction with sociocultural experiences, several pure prototypes, numerous subtypes, and well as any number of levels of healthy and unhealthy multiforms. Third, there is a need to develop a schema of trait characteristics and associated quantitative tools by which we can differentiate and assess the personality types and subtypes. Numerous theories have been advanced from which selective trait features are highlighted; for example, those that give primacy to interpersonal relations, or cognitive beliefs, or intrapsychic processes, or neurologically based dispositions. Each of these is productive as a source of personological or clinical study. But, the singularity of their focus is severely limiting. We believe a trait format should incorporate and subsume all of these part function characteristics in an overarching schema of trait domains, e.g., interpersonal conduct, cognitive style, mood temperament. Similarly, mathematical efforts have been employed to deduce traits from covariant data sources, the most popular of these being several factorial procedures. As will be noted later, numerical procedures, in our judgment, of either a simple arithmetic character or a more complex algebraicformula, are likely to be a more productive methodological resource than factor analysis for assessing quantitative gauges of the several trait domains. These will be touched upon in later paragraphs as well.
We humans, understandingly, have subdivided nature’s intrinsic oneness into spheres of attention and focus in order to simplify our task of understanding it; hence, we have physics, chemistry, geology, and the like. In doing so, however, we have overlooked or bypassed those deeper and essential commonalities they share. As addressed in earlier books and articles of ours, we judge that principles of an evolutionary character underlie all of them, that is, laws and processes that all our man-made distinct sciences share in common. Though “discovered” initially in the biological sciences, evolution refl ects a set of natural laws applicable to both the physical and the psychological sciences. To us, these common rudiments and universal operations of nature also undergird our science’s study of the problems of persons, as well as the logic we should follow, when needed, to select the focus and modes for their treatment.
It is our view that much of psychological science remains adrift, obsessed with horizontal refi nements and passing fads, a patchwork quilt of dissonant concepts and methods, rather than a unifi ed tapestry that interweaves (unifi es) its components to these deeper fundamental and common principles of nature. Table 1.1 provides an outline of the fi ve components the senior author has articulated as a unifying paradigm for the subject dmains of personology and psychopathology. It recommends that these fields be grounded in evolutionary principles and be designed thereby to cohere the elements and functions that comprise a science of clinical psychology. To fail to build such a unifying paradigm of personology and psychopathology will keep us on the same unprogressive course that has plagued the fi eld since time immemorial. Brilliant theoretical ideas have been proposed in the past, articulate classifi cation systems and quantitatively sensitive assessment instruments have been generated, as well as imaginative therapies developed, but we remain stuck in a babble of confl ict and confusion in which little is synthesized or structured logically. Integrating the several prime components comprising a clinically oriented personological science, grounded in the generative paradigm provided by evolutionary principles, will provide an undergirding framework for integrative assessment and treatment interventions. It is a task worthy of collaborative efforts on our part.

Normal Personality and Abnormal Personality

Normal Personality and Abnormal Personality
Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts. Only when personality traits are infl exible and maladaptive and cause signifi cant functional impairment or subjective distress, do they constitute Personality Disorders. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 686)The personality types diagnosed as disorders were not derived from an empirically based taxonomy or comprehensive theory. Rather, they are the product of a consensus of opinion among the scientists and practitioners who made up the PDs work group authorized by the American Psychiatric Association to develop Axis II. The inclusion of normative, adaptive traits [in DSM-V ] will facilitate the provision of a more comprehensive (and accurate) description of each patient’s general personality structure; it will facilitate an integration of the diagnostic manual with basic science research on generalpersonality structure; and it will facilitate treatment decisions through the recognition of traits that contribute to an understanding of treatment responsivity.

History
Anthropologists and sociologists speculate that the behavioral consistencies we refer to as personality were recognized by the prehistoric peoples who formed the fi rst stable groups and societies. Philosophical accounts of individual differences in human character appeared over 2500 years ago (e.g., Thales, Empedocles, Plato), and by the time of Christ several writers from Greece (e.g., Heraclitus, Socrates, Hippocrates, Aristotle, Galen) had created sophisticated theories that explained normal and abnormal behaviors as a function of ethereal manipulation, social pressures, personal choices, and physical characteristics such as the quantity of fl uids or “humors” in the body. Although many of the observations made by these pioneers were eclipsed long ago, several important ideas remain current in the twenty-fi rst century; for example, the concepts of temperament, type, taxonomy, and continuity between normal and abnormal behaviors (Durant, 1939; Hergenhahn, 1992; Millon, 2004; Russell, 1945). Progress in understanding personality from a scientifi c perspective took a giant leap forward following Darwin’s (1859) discovery of the evolution of species. The process of natural selection provided an intriguing explanation for the development of complex behavior patterns as means for survival, adaptation, and procreation. Although Darwin did not elaborate on the origin of group and individual differences at the phenotypic (observed) level, his contemporaries and followers (e.g., Galton, Helmholtz, Wundt, James) helped create the fl edgling science of psychology from philosophy as the study of human behavior. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scientifi c and technological advances helped psychologists develop complex explanations for behavioral consistencies as stemming from a mixture of evolutionary, biological, social, and personal variables (Goodwin, 1998; Koch & Leary, 1992). Based on his training in neurology, clinical observations of neurotic patients, and appreciation of Darwinian theory, Sigmund Freud (1895/1966; 1915/1957) sought to develop a comprehensive model of normal and abnormal human behaviors based on neurological evolution. Although many aspects of Freud’s neurobiological model did not take hold among his contemporaries, his method of understanding behavior from a psychodynamic perspective did, and later spawned rival paradigms that viewed behavior as stemming from social, familial, interpersonal, cognitive, and learning factors (e.g., Freud, 1923/1961; Goodwin, 1998; Hergenhahn, 1992). Like Darwin, Freud gave us ideas that allowed people from many disciplines to discuss human behavior from a completely new viewpoint. Freud could explain normal as well as abnormal behavior, and he could treat people with a variety of ailments using his psychoanalytic methods. However, his ideas seemed to explain some behaviors better than others; he lacked a comprehensive taxonomy, and he discouraged experimental validation. The study of personality went in many directions after Freud. In America, the psychologists Gordon Allport (1937) and Henry Murray (1938) developed a scienceof personology that was independent of abnormal behavior. European psychologists continued to be infl uenced by psychodynamic thinkers like Fenichel (1945) and Reich (1949), but some rejected Freud and his followers in favor of the taxonomic, biological observations of those such as Kraepelin (1904), Bleuler (1924), Kretschmer (1925), and Jaspers (1948). The comprehensive models of normal and abnormal personality begun in the 1930s and 1940s by Cattell (1946) and Eysenck (1947) exemplify this latter group. The Second World War (WWII) shifted the heart of science to America as well as to theories that could explain behavior from sociocultural and interpersonal perspectives (e.g., Fromm, Horney, Sullivan). Another consequence of WWII was the proliferation of nonmedically trained mental health practitioners, particularly clinical psychologists, who helped shape the future of mental health theory and treatment. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, students of human behavior could pick from dozens of theories that explained various forms of normal and abnormal functioning from intrapsychic, biological, behavioral, interpersonal, phenomenological, and sociocultural perspectives (Hall & Lindzey, 1979; Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). Too often these theories focused on specifi c phenomena or global aspects of functioning, normal or abnormal behavior, and either etiology or treatment of dysfunction. In many ways, the person got lost in an effort to explain behavioral details or outside shaping forces. The atheoretical, multiaxial DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) separated personality from other mental disorders and asked practitioners to consider the pathology they were treating from whatever vantage point they felt was appropriate, in the context of the whole person. Just as Darwin and Freud had galvanized the attention of scientists from many walks of life, and created a fl urry of new ideas and research, DSM-III radically changed the way behavioral scientists conducted themselves in the clinic and laboratory. Like deregulation in the modern economic marketplace, by cutting itself loose from the past DSM-III gave free reign to the scientifi c community to step in and fi ll the knowledge gaps created by the new system. This alone brought a stampade of new theorists and researchers into the area. But just as central is that by giving PDs their own axis, and asking clinicians to consider the stable trait characteristics of all their patients, personality was elevated to a level of importance it had never had before. A consequence of this is that many more patients were diagnosed with PDs (e.g., Loranger, 1990). With more PD patients to treat, better treatments were needed. More money poured into PD research, and of course, this attracted more people into the area. After DSM-III researchers began focusing on the interface between normal and abnormal behaviors. They started questioning the need for separate theories that addressed symptoms outside the scope of personality, or health beyond the scope of pathology, and helped people begin to see the similarities in theories hat previously seemed different. The hope of integrating ideas about the nature of human development, perso nality functioning, psychopathology, and treatment is again pushing through. People from different disciplines and schools of thought are now working toward a comprehensive, biopsychosocial understanding of normal and abnormal behaviors that can encompass, or be compatible with, the many perspectives that have shown promise in the past, including biological, psychodynamic, sociocultural, and interpersonal (Strack & Lorr, 1994a). In the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century the study of personality has moved beyond the confi nes of the DSM (Livesley, 2001a; Widiger & Simonsen, 2005). As notedpreviously, the DSM model does not offer an empirically based taxonomy, and it has kept its categorical distinction between normality and pathology in the face of scientifi c evidence that argues against this. But just as contemporary personologists have moved away from atheoretical, dualistic conceptions of human behavior, they no longer expect a single model of behavior to encompass the vast array of human features, both normal and abnormal. There is greater tolerance for, and interest in, dimensional conceptualizations of personality and psychopathology that have empirical backing, as well as models that predict and demonstrate discontinuity in some behaviors and disorders (e.g., schizotypy; Lenzenweger & Korfi ne, 1992).

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY
Although initiated in the 1940s, the movement to internationalize counseling psychology in the United States only began to pick up steam over the past decade. Many messages have been sent articulating the utility of cross-cultural competence, but it has taken some time for these messages to take root. Since 2000, there has been an accelerated interest in international perspectives in U.S. counseling psychology journals, a supportive infrastructure in U.S. professional associations, growing interest in training international students, and increased cross-national communication and collaborations. Moreover, counseling and counseling psychology professions are vigorously growing around the world, with a multiplicity of professional identities, training and credentialing standards, and professional service delivery models in evidence to address a broad range of societal needs.
Overcoming Ethnocentrism
Several authors have suggested that the biggest challenges for U.S. psychologists, including counseling psychologists, is overcoming ethnocentrism (e.g., Cheung, 2000; Gerstein, 2005; Heppner, 2006;Leong & Blustein, 2000; Marsella, 1998; McWhirter, 2000; Norsworthy, 2005; Pedersen & Leong, 1997; Segal, Lonner & Berry, 1998). During the 1980s, some counseling psychologists questioned the value of such international experiences. McWhirter (2000) wrote that “my professional colleagues were supportive and happy for me, but many could not understand why a counseling psychologist would want to take his family to Turkey for anything other than a brief tourist trip, and some even questioned that” .It was not uncommon for the motivations of counseling psychologists interested in international topics to be questioned, with the presumption that they are “only looking for an excuse for foreign travel” (McWhirter, 2000, p. 118). Undoubtedly, such attitudes and beliefs among U.S. counseling psychologist affected the development of the international movement in the counseling profession in the past. When we are unaware of cultural issues, it is difficult to know what we do not know; this lack of awareness significantly restricts understanding, sensitivity, and appropriate responses. Based on the U.S. multicultural literature, exposure may be an important first step in breaking down ethnocentric walls. Qualitative and single-subject methods in conjunction with quantitative designs may be useful for scholars who choose to examine ethnocentrism and ways to reduce its limiting influences (see Morrow, Rakhsha, & Castaneda, 2001, regarding qualitative research designs that can be applied to studying cross-cultural ethnocentrism).

Enhancing Cross-Cultural Competence
Historical analysis of the past 60 years suggests that the U.S. counseling psychology profession has evolved from the notion of “helping” our international colleagues and moved toward building mutually beneficial, egalitarian cross-national collaborative relationships. However, building such relationships is often a complicated and challenging process that is not well understood. As Heppner (2006) noted, “it is all too easy to offend our international colleagues, and at the same time, all too easy for us to become anxious or feel offended as well” (p. 169). Such feelings often inhibit further development of cross-national collaborative relationships. Thus, a key issue for the future of the profession is enhancing cross-cultural competence (Heppner, 2006). Anumber of scholars have written about various aspects of cross-cultural competence (e.g., Heppner, 2006; Leong & Ponterotto, 2003). Marsella and Pedersen (2004) provided a wide array of suggestions for internationalizing the counseling psychology curriculum. At this point, a major challenge for U.S. counseling psychologists is not only overcoming our ethnocentrism, but also deconstructing and thereby understanding the ambiguous construct of cross-cultural competence. Cross-cultural competence is so basic and fundamental to the internationalization movement, but also so ambiguous and overwhelming at the same time. The challenge is not only to define and assess cross-cultural competence (i.e., attitudes, knowledge, awareness, and skills), but also to learnhowto promote it in the next generation of counseling psychologists. Given the dearth of information on this topic, qualitative methodologies and singlesubject methodology may prove useful in promoting model building.

Cultural Sensitivity versus Imposed Etics in Theory Development

A number of cross-cultural psychologists have warned of the dangers associated with the monopoly and hegemony of Western models of science (e.g., Gerstein, 2005; Leong, 2002; Marsella, 1998, 2006; Norsworthy, 2005). An important challenge is to recognize that our theoretical models may work in the United States but not necessarily in other countries. Cross-cultural psychologists have labeled this ethnocentric tendency in scienceimapsosed etics—the assumption that the theories and models that apply to a person’s cultural group are universal and can be easily applied to other cultural groups. There are several approaches to including a cultural context in psychological theories (Heine et al., 2004; Leong, 2002). The first is thueniversalismapproach where culture is considered to bean unimportant and nuisance variable that needs little or no attention. The cultural variable is essentially ignored. This universalism approach serves as the foundation for “imposed etics.” The second is theculture assimilationapproach wherein cultural differences are recognized but minimized based on the “melting pot” assumption that other racial or cultural groups will assimilate to mainstreamAmerican culture (Western European culture). To the extent that these groups assimilate, mainstream psychological theories and models will work equally well with them. In the international realm, this implies that Western models can be transported to other cultures and that globalization will make it relatively easy for these models to be assimilated into other countries. Leong and colleagues (Leong & Lee, 2006; Leong & Serafica, 2001; Leong & Tang, 2002) have proposed another approach, the cultural accommodation model (CAM). This model aims to identify the missing cultural elements in the Western models from a cross-cultural perspective and potential culture-specific variables that can be used to address these cultural lacunae in Western models. This model involves three steps: (1) identifying the cultural gaps or blind spots of existingWestern theories and models that restrict their cultural validity, (2) selecting current culturally specific concepts and models from cross-cultural and ethnic minority psychology to fill in the cultural gaps and modify or accommodate the theory to these cultural groups, and (3) testing the culturally accommodated theory to determine if it has incremental validity beyond the culturally unaccommodated theory. Most important, the CAM model strongly suggested that psychologists as scientists should test the theory or model with demonstrated incremental validity provided by the culture-specific variables (Quintana, Troyano, & Taylor, 2001). Asignificant amount of cross-cultural research is aimed at evaluating the cultural validity ofWestern models when applied to other cultures. In some instances, the Western models of psychology will be found to be culturally valid and more than adequate when directly applied to cultural groups in other countries or regions. In other instances, some of the cultural validity studies will find problems and inadequacies in Western models. It is important to note that although a Western model, or a modified Western model using the CAM or any other approach, might be able to predict or explain a particular phenomenon (e.g., psychological adjustment) in another culture outside the United States, it may not necessarily depict the most important constructs to explain a particular phenomenon in that culture. Although Western-based instruments have been appropriately translated, back-translated, and predict intended outcomes in other cultures, the cultural assumptions inherent in those inventories may not necessarily include the most important psychological constructs pertaining to that phenomenon in a non-Western culture. For example, U.S.-based applied problem solving and coping inventories have been utilized in many cultures around the world. But Heppner et al. (2006) found very different coping factors when Asian values and customs were utilized to create items; these East Asian coping factors depicted other psychological constructs that do not appear in U.S. models. In short, the underlying cultural assumptionsbionththeWestern models as well as the target culture must be adequately addressed in applying any psychological models from one culture to another. Thus, another approach is to first identify constructs and build theoretical models based on the cultural assumptions and customs of that particular culture, and then examine howWestern-based constructs (and their underlying values) that have been particularly useful in the United States might add to a particular cultural model. This approach is more in line with the development of indigenous models to explain psychological phenomena in a particular culture and similar to the derived etic method in cross-cultural psychology research (Berry, 1989 ). In short, identifying the match underlying the assumptions/cultural values of both cultures is a critical step to becoming culturally sensitive in cross-cultural theory development. Just as we cannot assume that a Western theory of counseling is automatically going to work for other cultural groups, we cannot assume that certain culture-specific variables being added in any approach are automatically going to improve the cultural validity of the theory in question Gerstein, & Canel, in press). It is quite conceivable that different versions of a culturally sensitive model will have to be tested before the best set of variables can be found. The major foci andchallenge for counseling psychology cross-cultural research is to develop knowledge bases and to interpret what we have observed in a culturally sensitive and appropriate way.

Supporting and Extending Indigenous Psychologies
Related to the need to avoid imposed etics, there has been a movement in cross-cultural psychology that calls for the support oifndigenous psychologieass a countervailing force to the wholesale exportation ofWestern models of psychology to other parts of the world (Kim & Berry, 1993).Aquote from Durgan and Sinha (1993) in a chapter on indigenous psychology in India captures the essence of the problem quite well: When modern scientific psychology, based on the empirical, mechanistic, and materialistic orientations of the West, was imported into India as part of the general transfer of knowledge, it came in as a ready made intellectual package in the first decade of the cent.u.r.yI.nfact, this transfer in a way constituted an element of the political domination of theWest over the third world countries in the general process of modernization and Westernization . . . . Research conducted was by and large repetitive and replicative in character, the object being to supplement studies done in the West . . . . Thus, the discipline remained at best a pale copy of Western psychology, rightly designated as a Euro-American product with very little concern with social reality as it prevailed in India.
With the increasing internationalization of U.S. counseling psychology, it is incumbent on us not only to examine the cultural relevance of our models of counseling in other countries but also to support the identification, development, and evaluation of indigenous models of helping as potentially equally valid ways of healing. Indeed, many of these indigenous models predateWestern models of counseling and psychotherapy. We also have much to gain by testing the generalizability of the knowledge and theories developed in other countries to U.S. populations. Our international colleagues have developed tremendous knowledge bases through their research and practice spanning hundreds and thousands of years. Ponterotto (Chapter 8, this volume) addresses the potential utility for U.S. counseling psychologists to apply knowledge on thmeulticultural personalitythat has been developed in the Netherlands. Moreover, the culturally related knowledge from other countries has the potential to help us conceptualize novel intervention strategies to address old problems. For example, the collectivistic-based school counseling program (Chao, Wang, & Yang, 2006) in Taiwan has tremendous potential for U.S. school counselors. Our challenge is to identify relevant knowledge bases developed in other countries and test their applicability to solving problems in the United States.
Promoting the Integration of Multicultural and Cross-Cultural Foci

American counseling psychologists need to promote the integration and coexistence of multicultural and cross-cultural foci. In the past, there has been some tension between psychologists engaged in the U.S. multicultural movement and those engaged in cross-national activities. Sometimes the tension seems to result from the belief that a focus on cross-cultural issues will diminish or detract from a focus on multicultural issues, or vice versa. Henderson, Spigner-Littles, and Milhouse (2006) cited the necessity of understanding both indigenous and foreign cultures, “if practitioners are to understand traditional African Americans, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, and Mexican Americans, they must first understand traditional African, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican cultures” (p. vii). A common goal of both foci is to promote the understanding of the role of culture in human behavior, and the absolute necessity of utilizing a cultural context in all aspects of our work as counseling psychologists. An increased sensitivity to the role of culture in understanding human behavior makes us better counseling psychologists. It is incumbent on scholars to demonstrate how multicultural and cross-cultural foci can build on and enrich one another in the service of common goals.Challenge 6: Promoting Cross-National Research Collaborations Time and space have shrunk, making communication and travel across national borders commonplace. At this time, U.S. counseling psychologists often travel to different countries; learn from others’models, worldviews, and experiences; and work collaboratively with international colleagues. It is more than abundantly clear that human beings’ emotions, cognitive functions, motivations, reasoning, problem solving, and many other psychological constructs are learned, displayed, and interpreted in cultural contexts. Cross-cultural research has the potential to greatly enhance the knowledge bases in our specialty. Moreover, as responsible and culturally sensitive researchers, we need to obtain data from more international samples to expand knowledge bases.
It has been almost 30 years since the first call for diverse methodologies (Gelso, 1979), which has had a significant impact on counseling psychology (Heppner, Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008). We envision another methodological revolution, one that will spark a fundamental change in the way we structure research questions and ideas, as well as conduct and evaluate research. Future researchers will constantly consult and collaborate with their international colleagues to exchange the latest research findings, formulate their research ideas in multinational research teams, collect data from many different countries, and discuss their results across various cultural contexts. Their papers will be reviewed by U.S. and international editors and reviewers. The challenge for the counseling profession is how to promote and conduct meaningful cross-national research and create cross-cultural knowledge bases in counseling psychology. Two strategies to promote cross-cultural knowledge are by composing cross-national research teams and by conducting research on immigrant or international populations in the United States. The different cultural assumptions among members of international research teams can create obstacles and challenges. International research collaboration involves time, energy, and a good deal of relationship development. Research team members with different cultural perspectives may require more cross-cultural problem solving.As with domestic research teams, it is essential to start with networking and relationship building to get to know potential research collaborators. There is a need for more information about what factors promote successful cross-national research. Onestrategy is to identify “best practices” by studying cross-national research teams that have been more and less effective. Another strategy is to study “best practices” in training the next generation of crossnational researchers in our graduate programs. It might also be useful to study successful cross-national researchers to identify effective coping strategies, communication styles, and personality variables.We need to know much more about the factors that promote successful cross-national research teams.
Promoting Culturally Valid Practice around the Globe
Counseling practitioners worldwide often find inspiring new ideas from their foreign peers. Tai Chi and meditation are accepted as being therapeutic by a larger audience in the United States more now than 10 years ago. There is currently an active exchange of practical experiences with cohorts from different countries. There is a growing interest by U.S. researchers in the mental health and career needs in several Asian countries, most notably China. There is also interest in exporting U.S. counseling knowledge, philosophy, and techniques to China. However, we are responsible for ensuring that our knowledge, philosophy, and techniques are culturally relevant in different environments. Practice developments in counseling can greatly facilitate understanding of how culture affects the counseling process and outcomes across different cultures. A major challenge is not only to internationalize U.S. counseling practice, but also to validate, present, and publish research on the utility of cross-cultural practice.

Enhancing and Promoting International Education

There are a number of unaddressed questions about the type of training that is best for international students. Most if not all of theAPA-accredited doctoral programs train students in U.S.-based assessmentmodels, counseling theories, and intervention strategies. Although the multicultural movement has broadened the U.S. training model overall, it remains aWestern model based onWestern values. Some colleagues maintain that international students enrolled in U.S. training programs should be able to counsel effectively in the United States and, indeed, some international graduates do seek employment in the United States. But should the mission of our training programs be bound to U.S. culture alone, or should it include the ability to work in other cultures? Should we have additional or different training goals for students intending to return to their home countries? Are these students expected to attain the same level of skill using Western counseling methods as U.S. students? Should an Asian international student who plans to return to his or her country also learn how to confront a client in ways that include relevant Asian values (e.g., interpersonal harmony)? One challenge facing the counseling profession pertains to the training goals for international students who plan to return to their home countries, or who have different worldviews and interpersonal styles that fit an individualistic culture more or less well. A related challenge pertains to understanding how international students can promote the understanding of cultural differences and sensitivity in our training programs. A recent study found that 90% of counselor educators sampled agreed that the cross-cultural perspectives of international counseling students had positively enriched their program, and 83% agreed that working with international counseling students had positively affected them personally and professionally (Ng, 2006).We believe that we could learn much more from the international students currently enrolled on our campuses . Sometimes the learning in our training programs is perceived as primarily a unidirectional process (from instructor to student) as opposed to a bidirectional process where international students and U.S. students and faculty learn about cross-cultural issues from their interactions and discussions throughout the educational process. Moreover, having good relationships between domestic and international students today means networking with international leaders tomorrow. Promoting meaningful linkages between our domestic and international students may contribute to the internationalization of our profession. Thus, a related challenge for U.S. training programs is to identify ways to benefit maximally from the diverse cross-cultural awareness, knowledge, and skills that currently exist in many counselor training programs. Finally, there is much to gain from U.S. graduate students studying abroad (e.g., see Alexander et al., 2005). There are many ways for students to learn from our international colleagues, such as workshops, brief 2-week immersions, semester- or year-long study abroad experiences, and dual-degree programs. Similar to the reports from Fulbright scholars, students report that their cross-cultural learning experiences are not only stimulating, but also sometimes transforming (e.g., Friedlander et al., 2002). But why are so few counseling psychology graduate students studying abroad? (J. Ponterotto, personal communication, February 22, 2007). Our challenge is to internationalize the training curriculum by developing effective cross-cultural learning opportunities for U.S. students in counseling psychology.

Collaboration among Counseling Organizations
In analyzing the recent history of U.S. counseling psychology, Heppner et al. (2000) concluded, “the profession has now evolved beyond any one organization. Collaboration among Division 17, CCPTP [Council of Counseling Psychology Training Programs], ACCTA [Association of Counseling Center Training Agencies], and other groups has been and will continue to be critically important in the future” . Yet collaboration only among U.S.-based counseling organizations will not be sufficient in the future. Rather, it will be increasingly important to collaborate across counseling organizations around the globe—“there are common elements in the development of counseling psychology across national boundaries, and the voices of counseling psychology leaders from one country can support and lend credence in another country” (Heppner, 2006,). We have much to share and learn from each other’s experiences. The challenge is how to overcome cross-cultural obstacles to promote collaboration among counseling organizations around the world. It is incumbent on counseling leaders to understandthe many benefits of such collaboration and to build the necessary organizational structures to promote global alliances.

Information-processing types

Information-processing types
It is rather generally assumed that information processing is a major basis for most behaviours which humans demonstrate in daily life conditions. Individual differences in the ways people process information are major candidates for defining personality. However, what type of model is best suited to accommodate individual differences based on information processing? Our contribution to answering that question is based on the results of our studies. The physiological measures scrutinized here have found an almost natural fit in three independent dimensions. Formally speaking, those dimensions come up to all requirements that are usually imposed on personality traits. earlier studies of the energetic dimensions have invariably revealed a great deal of consistency across time and across situations. Furthermore energetics have revealed a great deal of genetic influence. Accordingly, if one intends to study personality at the energetics level, information-processing traits are the obvious choice. However, if one is interested in overt behaviour the picture changes drastically. As regards overt behaviour the energetic dimensions interact. This implies that a given score on one dimension may underlie behaviours that are qualitatively different depending on the individual’s scores on the other dimensions. Accordingly, rather than three different trait dimensions regarding overt behaviour we must think in terms of eight different types. Personality can be defined as the intra-individual organization of information-processing dimensions. Personality types are persons with similar intra-individual organizations of the information-processing dimensions. If our information-processing variables occupy the central position we think they do, persons of the same type may be expected to behave in similar ways. Information processing is directly connected with the presence or absence of control in a variety of situations. I expect information processing to become manifest in the behaviours that people show in daily life. In domains of a recurrent nature they will
obtain the character of ‘styles’. Examples are the styles that people demonstrate in major professional activities like teaching, sports, arts, selling and managing. For a long time, psychologists have successfully explored and mapped styles in those areas. However, why and how they are connected with personality has never been sufficiently explained. Our informationprocessing approach may provide a new framework here. An assumption to be tested first is that information processing provides a basis for job control in a more general sense.
Direct evidence bearing on this question has been obtained in a recent study of job control (Riteco, 1998). Riteco asked 180 workers at a Dutch university to indicate how far they were able to control a number of key situations in teaching and research. He also asked them to indicate to what extent they pursued the different delta goals in their work.preference for each of the delta goals is connected with job control. This finding suggests that in the same university jobs different delta goals may be emphasized all having a positive effect on control in key situations. This is tantamount to saying that it may be useful to distinguish among different occupational styles. The information-processing types proposed here may provide an explanation. To study the capacity of the information-processing types to explain occupational styles we addressed the domains of teaching, designing and leadership. For teaching we re-analysed the data of a now classical study of teaching styles (Hettema, 1972). In that study lessons given by 100 high school teachers in the areas of English and mathematics were observed. Detailed observation of teacher behaviour included technical acts, like explaining, asking questions, giving feedback, using the blackboard, but also social behaviours likecracking jokes, addressing pupils, giving support, maintaining order, gesticulating, punishing, etc. Based on long-term behaviour observation, we found clear differences in the ways teachers dealt with subject matter, with classroom activities and with student social behaviour. Teacher behaviour could be classified as reflecting one of six different styles. The styles were labelled the normative, structuring, accepting, stimulating, directive and supportive style of teaching. For the different styles we identified the dominant delta goal present in the behaviours defining the style and found some clear relationships with delta social control, control, proximity, knowledge, agency and support .

A completely different area is architectural designing. Van Bakel (1995; Hettema and Van Bakel, 1997) studied information processing in reports of 52 experienced architects while designing new buildings. As a major tool he used an S-R inventory containing ten typical designing situations. In each situation the architects reported on the decisions they would make when confronted with such a task. Decisions could be based mainly on the building site S, the program or design brief P, or pre-existing conceptions C of what the building should look like. The results showed clear individual differences in information processing that were rather consistent across different designing tasks. The different ways of processing information could be allocated to six designing styles. The feasability style is dominated by making inventories to be aware of all the problems to be met, emphasizing delta knowledge. Typical for the pragmatic style are trial and error toimprove the existing conditions before designing starts: delta preparation. A primary concern in the convergent style is turn to the building site and study the natural environment as a major prerequisite. Delta proximity may be the underlying delta goal. In
the analogic style the design is derived analogically from forms existing before in the head of the architect. This rather conservative approach might reflect delta control. In the
iconic style a fixed mental image is adopted as a powerful guideline and all other data are
subordinate to that image. Delta agency might be the underlying goal. In the syntactic style geometrical proportions and modular grids are employed as shape decision rules. This type of designing provides the designer with authority for a great manydecisions that are otherwise left to his own judgement: delta social control. An area where styles have obtained special attention is leadership. In earlier work the main objective of leadership research was to provide means for selecting good managers. This approach put special emphasis on authoritarian versus democratic leadership, sometimes completed with laissez-faire. However, in recent work more refinement has been obtained. Thus, for instance, House and Mitchell (1974) made a distinction into six different styles: authoritarian, performance-oriented, participating, democratic, directive and supporting styles of leadership. In this model, rather than criteria used by selectors the goals of the leaders are emphasized. Democratic leaders are primarily interested in knowing what their co-workers want. Participating leaders want to work in close connection with the others. Performance-oriented leaders are interested in production or output, no matter how this is attained. Supporting leaders on the other hand, are especially concerned with underachievers, for whom they provide help whenever necessary. The main objective of directive leaders is to have others behave according to their own preferences. Finally, authoritarian leaders will impose norms, pass judgement and punish co-workers not living up to company standards. There are some clear relationships between the leader goals and the delta goals proposed here.Styles like these have been proposed without much theory guiding them. Particularly, the question why styles are so hard to be altered has always remainedenigmatic. Now it can be seen why and how persons functioning in the same environment emphasizing the same company goals use different stylistic means for goal attainment.
Clearly much work remains to be done in the area of occupational styles.The information-processing types may be crystallized in the delta goals emphasized. A further step would be to assess the dominant energetic patterns of those people confronted with films representing those settings.

Emotion-volition interactions

Emotion-volition interactions
A central contention of this chapter is that part of the individual differences observed in social information-processing elements are due to inheritable differences in informationprocessing energetics. Our first hypothesis states that all three energetic dimensions are involved. However, rather than a linear additive model we expected the dimensions to interact as regards the different elements of social information processing. Second hypothesis states that specific patterns of emotional and volitional information processingunderlie goals and beliefs. For instance, in primary control delta goals are central elements. People with a tendency to react with a specific energetic pattern are expected to pursue the corresponding delta goal rather than people with a tendency to react with other energetic patterns. For primary control the hypotheses were tested in a recent study in which 87 female twins were observed in eight different situations (Hettema and Lensvelt- Mulders, in preparation). The situations were presented in two different modes: films and verbal descriptions. During the films physiological reactions on seven variables were registered continuously and cast into dimension scores using the procedures given before. Each S obtained scores on each dimension in each situation. Delta goals were measured with an SR questionnaire in which brief descriptions of the situations were followed by 28 action descriptions. The actions were prototypical actions each representing one of the delta goals of social control, control, proximity, knowledge, agency, or preparation. The actions were obtained from four domains—the mental, social, physical and instrumental domains. In each situation offered the Ss indicated in how far they would consider acting like described. Delta goal scores were averages across domains. Our first analysis was directed at identifying the basic model underlying the relations. Two models were considered: the linear additive model and the interactive model. To test the models we obtained average dimension scores and average delta goal scores across the eight situations. First for the prediction of each delta goal the linear model was tested using multiple regression analysis as a tool. The resulting multiple Rs ranged from 0.08 for delta preparation to 0.15 for delta social control. Subsequently, we tested the interaction model by inserting two-way and three-way interaction terms in the regression model. The multiple Rs increased to values ranging from 0.20 for delta preparation to 0.26 for delta social control. In addition, for each analysis the regression coefficients for interactions were compared with those for the main effects. For the main effects the median (absolute) coefficient was 0.15, for first order interactions 0.21, and for second order interactions we found 0.38. We concluded that underlying delta goals are interactive energetic patterns rather than global differences in overall activity. The patterns were conceived as information-processing types emphasizing either controlled or automatic processing in each dimension. With dichotomies on the three dimensions there are eight different patterns Inspection of the regression coefficients led to hypotheses about the precise form of the patterns involved in each delta goal. The hypotheses were tested on relatively independent data using differences in situations rather than persons as a tool. First of all, we divided our sample into two equivalent subsamples of twin halves. For each subsample in each situation two scores were obtained: the number of patterns predicted to underlie a delta goal and the average delta goal preference score.Clearly, there are also differences in the specific systems emphasized. For instance controlled effort, sometimes connected with general intelligence, is related with delta knowledge, delta preparation, delta control and delta agency, but not with delta proximity or delta social control. As a whole these results are promising, although it should be kept in mind that the correlations reflect differences among situations, not individual differences.

Secondary control
A major difference between primary and secondary control is that primary control is proactive whereas secondary control is reactive. Primary control includes actions to maintain or increase control. For primary control no specific eliciting situation is required. Secondary control on the other hand includes reactions elicited by an uncontrollable situation. The prototype of uncontrollable situations are stress situations. Thus our central hypothesis regarding secondary control states that part of individual differences observed in coping reactions to stressful situations are due to inheritable differences in reactivity on the three energetic dimensions. Secondary control in general and coping in particular serves to give meaning to otherwise uncontrollable events. However, individuals show vast differences in the ways they provide meaning to the situation prevailing. Connected with those differences are the beliefs of individuals. In our view, beliefs are based on specific forms of processing emotional and volitional information. People with a tendency to react with those forms are expected to use the corresponding coping style rather than people tending to react with other forms. This hypothesis was tested in a recent study (Hettema and Geenen, in preparation) in which 43 male Ss were observed while being confronted with an accident presented on film. This particular film was chosen because, as earlier research had shown, watchingother people suffering is a potent stressor. The film contains a quiet household situation interrupted with an accident in which a person is hurt. The film was presented five consecutive times and physiological reactions were monitored continuously. All Ss completed a coping inventory based on the work of Folkman and Lazarus. The results indicated that when the actual stressor was met there was an increase in automatic reactivity in all systems reflecting emotion. As a reaction there was an increase of controlled activity in all systems reflecting volition. During the replications, previous to meeting the stressor all systems gave an increase of volitional activity interpreted as coping. Correlations were computed between energetic dimension scores in those phases and coping style.
The amount of stress experienced in a given situation is not necessarily equal for different persons. Our approach assumes differences in experience to occur as a function of the ways in which the information is processed. While the same situation is more stressful for some Ss than for others, coping behaviour will be more pronounced for those Ss. Therefore, clearly, this study needs replication with other stressors. Nevertheless we did find correlations between informationprocessing dimensions and some of the coping styles. These outcomes suggest that, like delta goals, coping styles may be characterized by specific patterns of information processing. Restricting ourselves to the significant correlations found the data suggest that two styles—planful/rational and daydreams/fantasies are predominantly volitional. Two other styles-self-blame and distancing—are mixed types involving emotion as well as volition.