The features that characterize normal personality styles

The features that characterize normal personality styles

1 Motivating styles are most closely akin to concepts such as need, drive, affect, and emotion in that they pertain to the strivings and goals that spur and guide the organism; that is, the purposes and ends that stir them into one or another course of behavior. The aims of motivation refl ect strivings for survival, which I see as composed of three elements, those I have referred to previously as “existence,” “adaptation,” and “replication” (Millon, 1990). In a manner akin to Freud (1915), these three elements are organized as bipolarities, each of which comprise two contrasting scales. At one extreme of the fi rst bipolarity is a motivation-based scale pertaining to the existential aim of strengthening one’s life or reinforcing one’s capacity to survive (phrased as pleasure-enhancing); at the other extreme is an emotion-based scale that refl ects the need to protect one’s survival against lifethreatening events (referred to as pain-avoiding). The second of the motivating aim bipolarities relates to adaptation, that is, methods by which one operates in one’s environment to enhance and preserve life. One end of this bipolarity represents tendencies to actively and energetically alter the conditions of one’s life, (termed actively modifying); the other end represents the inclination to passively accept in a neutral and nonresponsive manner ones’ life circumstances as they are given (referred to as passively accommodating). The third bipolarity comprising the motivating domain also differentiates two scales; one scale represents those who seek to realize and fulfi ll their own potentials before those of others (spoken of as self-indulging), as contrasted to those who are disposed to value the fortunes and potentials of relatives and companions to a greater degree than their own (called other-nurturing).

2 The second group of bipolarity scales relates to thinking styles, incorporating both the sources employed to gather knowledge about life, and the manner in which this information is transformed. In a manner akin to Jung (1923), four bipolarities, the constructs they reflect, and the eight scales developed to represent them comprise this section of the MIPS. Here we are looking at contrasting “modes of cognizing”, differences among people, first, in what they attend to in order to experience and learn about life and, second, what they habitually do to make this knowledge meaningful and useful to themselves. The first two of these bipolarities refer to the information sources to which attention and perception are drawn to provide cognitions. One pair of scales contrasts individuals who are disposed to look outward or external-to-self for information, inspiration, and guidance (termed externally focused ), versus those inclined to turn inward or internal-to-self (referred to as internally focused ). The second pair of scales contrasts predilections for direct observational experiences of a tangible, material, and concrete nature (labeled realistic-sensing) with those geared more toward inferences regarding phenomena of an intangible, ambiguous, symbolic, and abstract character (named imaginative-intuiting). The second set of thinking style bipolarities relate to processes of transformation; that is, ways inwhich information and experiences, once apprehended and incorporated, are subsequently evaluated and reconstructed mentally. The fi rst pair of the transformation scales differentiates processes based essentially on intellect, logic, reason, and objectivity (entitled thought-guided ) from those which depend on affective empathy, personal values, sentiment, and subjectivity (designated feeling-guided ). The second of the transformational scales are likewise divided into a bipolar pairing. At one end are reconstruction modes that transform new information so as to make it assimilate to preconceived formal, tradition-bound, well-standardized, and conventionally structured schemas (called conservationseeking); at the other bipolar scale are represented inclinations to avoid cognitive preconceptions, to distance from what is already known and to originate new ideas in an informal, open-minded, spontaneous, individualistic, and often imaginative manner (termed innovation-seeking).

3 The third group of bipolar scales represents behaving styles, reflecting how individuals prefer to relate to and conduct their transactions with others. These styles of social behavior derive in part from the interplay of the person’s distinctive pattern of motivating styles and thinking styles. Five bipolarities have been constructed to represent contrasting styles of interpersonal behaviors; in a broader context these styles of behavior may be considered to be located at the normal end of a spectrum continuum that shades progressively into the more problematic or abnormal personality disorders recorded in the DSM, Axis II. The fi rst pair of scales in this, the third section of MIPS-R, pertains to a bipolar dimension characterized by contrasting degrees of sociability. At one bipolar end are those persons whose high scale scores suggest that they relate to others in a socially distant, disengaged, affectless, and coolly indifferent manner (termed asocialwithdrawing); on the other high scale end are those who seek to be engaged, are lively, talkative, and actively engaged interpersonally (called gregarious-outgoing). The second polarity pair relates to ones’ comfort and poise in social settings; it contrasts those who tend to be uncertain and fearful, are unsure of their personal worth, and are inclined to feel insecure and to withdraw socially (named anxious–hesitating), with those who are socially comfortable and self-possessed, as well as bold and decisive in their relationships (entitled confi dent-asserting). The third pairing relates to contrasting degrees of conventionality and social deference; it differentiates those who are disinclined more than most to adhere to public standards, cultural mores, and organizational regulations, act autonomously and insist on functioning socially on their own terms (labeled unconventionaldissenting), as compared to those who are notably tradition-bound, socially compliant and responsible, respectful of authority, as well as appropriately diligent and reliable (termed dutiful-conforming). Facets of the interpersonal dimension of dominance–submission are tapped in the fourth polarity. High on one polar scale are those who are not only docile but also self-demeaning, diffi dent, overly modest, and self-depriving (designated submissive-yielding), as compared to those who, beyond being overbearing and arrogant, are also willful, ambitious, forceful, and power-seeking (termed dominant-controlling). The fi fth and fi nal set of polarities pertains to features of a dimension of social negativism versus social congeniality. The former is seen among those who are dissatisfi ed with both themselves and others, who are generally displeased with the status quo, and tend to be resentfuland oppositional (designated dissatisfi ed- complaining); they contrast with those who are helpful and compromising, not only considerate of others, but also highly obliging, and willingly adapting their behaviors to accord with the wishes of others (named cooperative-agreeing). As noted, scales refl ecting several “character styles” associated with constructive and positive orientations will be added to the forthcoming revision of the MIPS.

Assessment (Normal personality and Abnormal Personality)

Assessment (Normal personality and Abnormal Personality)

Instruments exist to assess whether persons are clinically problematic in one or another combination of polarity extremes. Best known among these is the MCMI (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, either versions I, II, or III) or the forthcoming MCMI-III; 2nd edition, 2006 (see Grossman & del Rio, 2005). Recent instruments geared to the theoretical model, but focused essentially on nonclinical or normal populations, have also been published. The Personality Adjective Check List (PACL) (Strack, 1987) was the fi rst and most direct form of these tools. More recent is the Millon Index of Personality Styles (MIPS-R), developed by the authors and their associates (Millon, Davis, & Weiss, 1993; Millon, Millon, & Weiss, 2003).
Abnormally Oriented Clinical Instruments
The initial tools developed on the basis of the evolutionary model were oriented primarily
to assess abnormal personality, termed disorders in the DSM, although other clinical syndromes were appraised by these instruments as well. Three initial diagnostic inventories instruments were constructed and published, the MCMI (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory), the MBHI (Millon Behavioral Health Inventory), updated a short time ago as the MBMD (Millon Behavioral Medicine Diagnositc) and the MAPI (Millon Adolescent Personality Inventory), replaced in recent years with the MACI (Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory).

MCMI
A 175-item true–false self-report inventory, the MCMI and its subsequent revisions, MCMI-II (Millon, 1987), MCMI-III (Millon, 1994), and MCMI-III, 2nd edition, 2006, (Millon, in press) include 14 abnormal personality scales [all of the personality disorders included in the main texts and appendices of the DSM-III, III-R, and IV; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1980, 1987, 1994)], nine clinical syndrome scales, as well as three “modifying indices” to appraise problematic response tendencies. Within the restrictions on validity set by the limits of the self-report mode, the narrow frontiers of psychometric technology, as well as the slender range of consensually shared diagnostic knowledge, all steps were taken to maximize the MCMIs concordance with its generative theory and the offi cial classifi cation system. Pragmatic and philosophical compromises were made where valued objectives could not be simultaneously achieved (e.g., instrument brevity versus item independence; representative national patient norms versus local base rate specifi city; theoretical criterion considerations versus empirical data).A major goal in constructing the MCMI was to keep the total number of items comprising the inventory small enough to encourage use in all types of diagnostic and treatment settings, yet large enough to permit the assessment of a wide range of clinically relevant behaviors. At 175 items, the fi nal form is much shorter than comparable instruments. Potentially objectionable statements were screened out, and terminology was geared to an eighth-grade reading level. As a result, the great majority of patients can complete the MCMI in 20–30 minutes. Unfortunately, as many have noted (Butcher, 1972), assessment techniques and personality theorizing have developed almost independently. As a result, few diagnostic measures either have been based on or have evolved from clinical theory. The MCMI is different. Each of its personality disorder and clinical syndrome scales was constructed as an operational measure of a syndrome derived from a theory of personality and psychopathology (Millon, 1969, 1981, 1990).
No less important than its link to theory is an instrument’s coordination with the offi cial diagnostic system and its syndromal categories. With the advent of the various recent DSMs (APA, 1980, 1987, 1994), diagnostic categories and labels have been precisely
specified and defined operationally. Few diagnostic instruments currently available are as consonant with the nosological format and conceptual terminology of this official system as the MCMI. Separate scales of the MCMI have been constructed in line with the DSM to distinguish the more enduring personality characteristics of patients (Axis II) from the acute clinical disorders they display (Axis I), a distinction judged to be of considerable use by both test developers and clinicians (Dahlstrom, 1972). This distinction should enable the clinician to separate those syndrome features of psychopathological functioning that are persistent and pervasive from those that are transient or circumscribed. Moreover, profiles based on all 23 clinical scales illuminate the interplay between long-standing characterological patterns and the distinctive clinical symptomatology a patient manifests under psychic stress.
Similarly, it seemed useful to construct scales that distinguish syndromes in terms of their levels of psychopathological severity. For example, the premorbid personality pattern of a patient is assessed independently of its degree of pathology. To achieve this in the recently published MCMI-III (see Figures 1.1–1.3), separate scales are used to determine the style of traits comprising the basic personality structure (Scales 1-8B) and the greater level of pathology of that structure (Scales S, B M1, M2 and P). In like manner, moderately severe clinical syndromes (Scales A, H, D, B, and T), notably those referred to traditionally as “neurotic,” are separated and independently assessed from those with parallel features but more of a so-called “psychotic” nature (Scales SS, CC, and PP).
Worthy of note in the just published MCMI-III, 2nd edtition, is the inclusion of facet scales designed to identify and measure several of the functional and structural personological domains cross-validation data gathered with nondevelopment samples supported the measure’s generalizability, dependability, and accuracy of diagnostic scale cutting lines and profi le interpretations. Large and diverse samples have been studied with the MCMI, but it is still necessary to achieve full domain coverage in ongoing cross-validation studies. Local base rates and cutting lines may continue to be developed for special settings. Nevertheless, validation data with a variety of populations (e.g., outpatients andinpatients; alcohol and drug centers) suggest that the various forms of the CMI can be used with a reasonable level of confi dence in most clinical settings. The MCMI is not a general personality instrument to be used for normal populations or for purposes other than diagnostic screening or clinical assessment. Hence, it contrasts with other, more broadly applied, inventories whose presumed utility for diverse populations is often highly questionable. Normative data and transformation scores for the MCMI are based on presumed clinical samples and are applicable therefore only to persons who evince psychological symptoms or are engaged in a program of professional psychotherapy or psychodiagnostic evaluation. As should be noted, there are distinct boundaries to the accuracy of the self-report method of clinical data collection; by no means is it a perfect data source. The inherent psychometric limits of the tools, the tendency of similar patients to interpret questions differently, the effect of current affective states on trait measures, the effort of patients to effect certain false appearances and impression, all narrow the upper boundaries of this method’s potential accuracy. However, by constructing a self-report instrument in line with accepted techniques of validation (Loevinger, 1957), an inventory should begin to approach these upper boundaries.

MBMD
In a manner similar to the various MCMI forms, these instruments are best employed with persons also being seen in a clinical or medical setting. In this regard, they differ from the PACL and the MIPS-R, to be discussed shortly. Let us briefl y describe the Millon Behavioral Medicine Diagnostic (MBMD:Millon, Antoni, Millon, Meagher, & Grossman, 2001) fi rst. MBMD. Using psychiatrically oriented psychological tests in settings primarily of a medical nature requires that their concepts and indices be translated to fi t new populations and purposes. Medical populations are not psychiatric populations, and viewing patients within traditional mental health constructs may prove neither valid nor useful. Of course, standard techniques can provide general information, such as levels of emotional health, or the presence of distinctive symptoms, such as depression or anxiety. Problems arise, however, because of the unsuitability of norms, the questionable relevance of clinical signs, and the consequent inapplicability of interpretations. In brief, a “standard” interpretation of results obtained with a medical sample on a diagnostic test developed on and designed to assess a psychiatric population may not characterize sound test use. MBHI. Developed in 1979, the MBHI was replaced by the Millon Behavior Medicine Diagnostic (MBMD) in 2001. Both were developed specifi cally with physically ill patients and medical–behavioral decision-making issues in mind. Brevity, clarity, and ease of administration were added to the goal of elucidating salient and relevant dimensions of functioning. The MBMD includes a series of negative health habit indicators (e.g., smoking) and several psychiatric indicators (e.g., depression). Also, 11 basic coping styles scales are included, each derived from the evolutionary theory of personality (1969, 1974, 1981, 1990, 1996). Other scales were developed additionally to refl ect stress moderators found in the research literature to be signifi cant precipitators or exacerbators of physical illness. A fi nal group of treatment prognostic scales were derived either to appraise the extent towhich emotional factors are likely to complicate therapeutic efforts and to predict psychological complications associated with such efforts. All items were selected with data comparing groups of general medical populations or differentiating among subgroups of patients. This shift to a general medical reference population, rather than the usual psychiatric comparison groups, was expected to optimize the discrimination efficiency of the scales; the assumption that these steps should heighten diagnostic accuracy was supported by cross-validation evidence. MAPI, MACI, and M-PACI. A variety of psychological tests have been developed through the years for use with adolescents and preadolescents. Often constructed in accord with the sophistication then available, their shortcomings are now evident as psychometric advances have taken place. Although these older instruments provide useful information, they tend not to be tuned to current issues and behaviors, and lack a theoretically grounded system of personality traits that can integrate the diverse features salient to the teen years. The Millon Adolescent Personality Inventory (Millon,
Green, & Meagher, 1982), also known as the MAPI, was normed on both abnormal (seen in clinical settings) and normal (seen in school and church settings) teenagers. The Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (Millon, Millon, & Davis, 1993) was based on 13–19-year old abnormal adolescents only, and developed to quantify relationships between traits and clinical states. The M-PACI or Millon PreAdolescent Clinical Inventory was designed as a self-report tool for youngsters between 9 and 12 years of age (Millon, Tringone, Millon & Grossman, 2005). The items that comprise these inventories were drafted in a language that teenagers and preteenagers use; they deal with matters teens can understand and fi nd relevant to their concerns and experiences. The most elegantly constructed psychometric tool is not likely to be widely accepted if its content, length, and linguistic style make it unwieldy. A major goal for the MAPI, MACI, and M-PACI was to construct inventories with enough items to assess and illuminate accurately a variety of personality traits, psychological concerns, and clinically relevant behaviors, yet be of suffi cient brevity to encourage its use in a variety of outpatient and residential settings. Both reading level and vocabulary were set to allow for ready comprehension by the vast majority of youngsters. The fi nal 160-item MACI inventory, geared to the sixth-grade reading level and the 97-item M-PACI test, geared to the third-grade level, can be completed by most youngsters in less than 20 minutes. The brevity and clarity of the instrument facilitates rapid administration with a minimum of client resistance.
Counselors, clinical psychologists, and psychiatrists were involved with the M-PACI and MACI throughout all phases of their development. At an early stage, clinicians were interviewed to ascertain issues relevant to both typical and troubled adolescents. The M-PACI has seven “emerging personality” scales and seven “clinical syndrome” scales. The MACI includes 12 personality scales that seek to parallel the DSM-IV disorders. It also possesses eight “expressed concern” scales that address the attitudes teenagers have regarding signifi cant developmental problems. In addition, there are seven clinical syndrome scales that refl ect major diagnostic categories associated with behaviors and thoughts that may pose serious diffi culties for the adolescent (e.g., suicide ideation, substance abuse). The capacity to differentiate each of the various clinical problem areas is a key to the effectiveness of the inventory. Hence, MACI item selections were made by comparing the targeted criterion group with a general, but troubled adolescent population. The use of reference groups such as these should substantially increase diagnostic discrimination efficiency. The M-PACI items were selected following substantial evidence of their correlation with clinician judgments of psychologists well-acquainted with their psychological problems.

Normality-Oriented Personality Instruments
As noted, the fi rst group of instruments generated by the theoretical model focused on abnormality and clinical diagnosis. As the theory was broadened to encompass personality traits and characteristics that fell within the so-called normal range (Millon, 1991), attention was directed to the development of suitability coordinated nonclinical assessment tools. Two such instruments have been constructed in line with this goal— the PACL (Strack, 1987), and the Millon Index of Personality Styles and its revision (Millon, 2004; Millon, Millon, & Davis, 1993). PACL. The fi rst instrument specifi cally designed to assess the theoretically derived personality types in a normal population was developed by a graduate research group led by the senior author in the early 1980s. As the project progressed through its early revisions, the major responsibility for its further development was undertaken by one of its members, Stephen Strack. Using the adjective checklist format, the initial forms (both clinician-rated and self-reported) were composed of 405 items that were intended to refl ect the theory’s original basic personality types and its three more severe personality variants.
Item refi nements and initial validation studies were based on data from over 2000 normal adults from a variety of diverse national settings. A wide range of validity data have been gathered and reported (Strack, 1987, 1991), including correlations with various
other gauges of personality and biographic data on current and past behavior. Each scale of the PACL appears consonant with theoretical expectations and their expected personality characterizations. Thus, the PACL Inhibited scale (which refl ects a milder variant of the theory’s active-detached pattern and the DSM’s avoidant personality disorder) is positively correlated with measures of shyness, submissiveness, and social anxiety, although being negatively correlated with measure of sociability, dominance, and emotional well-being. Similarly, the PACL Forceful scale (a milder version of the theory’s and DSM’s antisocial and sadistic disorders) is positively related to gauges of aggressiveness, arrogance, dominance, and negatively related to gauges of deference, submissiveness, and conscientiousness. Owing to the common linkage in theory there is a possibility that the results of the PACL might be erroneously confused with parallel revisions of the MCMI. High scores on the PACL scales do not signify the presence of personality disorders, as they do on the MCMI; rather, they suggest the presence of distinctive personality traits. As Strack (1991) notes, all persons in the PACL development group were presumed to have normal personalities, hence the special utility of the instrument as a measure of normality rather than abnormality.

MIPS-R.
This is a self-report inventory composed of sentence-length items rather than an adjective checklist, as is the PACL. Both are anchored to the theoretical modelformulated by Millon from the mid-1960s to the early 2000s. However, the PACL, as with the MCMI, focused its scales on personality types as a composite or whole, be they normal (PACL) or abnormal (MCMI). In contrast, the MIPS-R focuses on the constructs that underlie these personality types, the latent components that combine to give rise to them. To illustrate: The histrionic personality disorder (MCMI), termed “sociable” personality style (PACL), are the manifest abnormal and normal personality forms that take shape among those who are latently “active” on the active–passive polarity, and oriented to other on the self–other polarity. Focusing on these latent components, the first set of scales of the MIPS measure the three polarity pairs of the theory directly (e.g. pleasure–pain, active–passive, and self–other), rather than the manifest forms into which various combinations of these are exhibited.
Beyond breaking down the theory’s manifest personality types into their constituent latent constructs, the theory, as described in previous pages, has been expanded substantially. Whereas the three polarities of the theory are still considered crucial elements of the model and serve as a particularly important gauge of personality abnormality, they are now judged to be insuffi cient as a comprehensive scaffold for encompassing the highly diverse styles of normal personality. This is not the chapter to elaborate both the full rationale and specifi cs of the expanded model; recent essays on this theme may be found in the MIPS or MIPS-R manuals (Millon, Millon, Davis, & Weiss, 1993; Millon, Millon, & Weiss, 2003).
Briefl y, we should note that cognitive differences among individuals and the manner in which they are expressed have not been a suffi ciently appreciated domain for generating personality traits. We have added a set of four polarities that refl ect different “thinking styles” to the MIPS and MIPS-R. These follow the initial three polarities (e.g., self-other), which have been termed as “motivating styles.” Similarly, we have added a third domain of polarities to those of “motivation” and “cognition,” that are termed as “behaving styles.” We share the view of many who give the manifest forms of the interpersonal dimension a degree of centrality in their personality gauges; in fact, we do judge them no less signifi cant than either motivation or thinking styles, especially if they
are organized in terms of the latent polarities they express. Thus, a third domain, comprising fi ve interpersonal behavior polarities, concludes the MIPS-R test form, although work has begun on the inclusion of “character styles” to further advance the utility of the instrument in identifying positive and healthy orientations.
The following précis of the tripartite structure of the MIPS scales divides the test in the manner in which organisms function in their environment, one which we believe may be a useful theory-based schema for purposes of normal personological analysis. As noted previously, we have termed the fi rst segment in this tripartite sequence as motivating styles, to signify that the behaviors of organisms are prompted, energized, and directed by particular purposes and goals they wish to achieve. The second component of the sequence is labeled thinking styles to indicate the manner in which human organisms seek out, regulate, internalize, and transform information about their environment and themselves, a step necessary if organisms are to achieve their aims effectively. The third segment in the sequence is referred to as behaving styles to represent the different ways in which human organisms relate to and negotiate with other humans in their social environment in light of the aims that motivate them and the cognitions they have formed. To capture personality more-or-less fully we must fi nd ways to characterize all three components of the sequence: the deeper motives which orientindividuals, the characteristic sources they utilize to construct and to transform their cognitions, and the particular behaviors they have learned to relate to others interpersonally.

Millon’s Evolutionary Model for Normal and Abnormal Personality

Millon’s Evolutionary Model for Normal and Abnormal Personality

This is a time of rapid scientific and clinical advancement, a time that seems propitious for ventures designed to bridge new ideas and syntheses. The intersection between the study of “psychopathology” and the study of “personality” is one of these spheres of significant intellectual activity and clinical responsibility. Theoretical formulations that bridge this intersection would represent a major and valued conceptual step, but to limit efforts to this junction alone will lead to overlooking the solid footings necessary for fundamental progress, and which are provided increasingly by more mature sciences (e.g., physics and evolutionary biology). By failing to coordinate propositions and constructs to principles and laws established in these advanced disciplines, psychological science will continue to float, so to speak, at its current level, an act that will ensure the need to return to this task another day. The goal is to connect the conceptual structure of personology to its foundations in the natural sciences. What is proposed herein is a kind to Freud’s (1895) abandoned Project for a Scientific Psychology and Wilson’s (1975) highly controversial Sociobiology. Both were worthy endeavors to advance our understanding of human nature; this was to be done by exploring interconnections among disciplines that evolved ostensibly unrelated bodies of research and manifestly dissimilar languages. It is necessary, we believe, to go beyond current conceptual boundaries in psychology, more specifically to explore carefully reasoned, as well as “intuitive” hypotheses that draw their principles, if not their substance, from more established, “adjacent” sciences. Not only may such steps bear new conceptual fruits, but also they may provide a foundation that can undergird and guide our own discipline’sexplorations. Much of personology, no less psychology as a whole, remains drift,divorced from broader spheres of scientifi c knowledge, isolated from fi rmly grounded, if not universal principles, leading one to continue building the patchwork quilt of concepts and data domains that characterize the fi eld. Preoccupied with but a small part of the larger puzzle, or fearing accusations of reductionism, many fail thereby to draw on the rich possibilities to be found in other realms of scholarly pursuit. With few exceptions, cohering concepts that would connect this subject to those of its sister sciences have not been developed.
Despite the shortcomings of historic and contemporary theoretical schemas of most sciences, systematizing principles and abstract concepts can “facilitate a deeper seeing, a more penetrating vision that goes beyond superficial appearances to the order underlying them” (Bowers, 1977). For example, pre-Darwinian taxonomists such as Linnaeus limited themselves to “apparent” similarities and differences among animals as a means of constructing their categories. Darwin was not “seduced” by appearances. Rather, he sought to understand the principles by which overt features came about. His classifi cations were based not only on descriptive qualities but also on explanatory ones. Task in the evolutionary model to be that of peeling back the manifest character of the observable personological and clinical world of overt behaviors, thoughts, and emotions, to jettison its veneer, and to expose its latent or underlying functions. In discover and articulate a set of coherent principles and procedures that may advance and facilitate our understanding and assessment of both normal and abnormal subject domains. Some have said that our evolutionary model seeks “to read the mind of God” rather acquire a somewhat less presumptuous characterization, that of seeking “to read the mind of human nature.” A unifying model for personology and psychopathology must coalesce the field’s disparate schools of thought, not, however, in a haphazard way that simply identifies the alternatives or records their separate contributions, but in a manner that truly integrates each of these seemingly contradictory perspectives at a “deeper level,” that is, one that synthesizes the alternative components intrinsically. Although, random, eclectic, or broad-based theories have, as their benefit, the advantages of open-mindedness and comprehensiveness, they are likely to be generative of little more than providing a measure of illusory psychic comfort. A substantively unifying paradigm will interweave fundamental relationships that exist among the cognitive, biological, intrapsychic, and behavioral components that are inherent in the person. This will, in effect, generate integrative theoretical and assessment strategies. This desirable advantage has been achieved partially in psychotherapy by efforts to employ combinatorial treatment approaches (e.g., CBT, pharmacological/family interventions). However, even more synergy is possible and desirable. A unifi ed paradigm for the science of normal and abnormal personology must be based conceptually and pragmatically on interweaving the “whole person.”
It may be a useful digression to refer to scientific developments of t his character in other person- and treatment-oriented fields. Medicine, for example, has recently begun to focus on matters beyond surface symptomatology. Diseases in the past were “understood” and named only in accord with their overtly observable qualities (e.g., smallpox), in much the same way as we now refer to psychiatric entities such as “dysthymia” or “anxiety.” Late in the 19th century, a paradigm shift occurred when biologists andphysicians recognized that unseen “infectious agents” were central to the etiology and understanding of disease manifestation. Symptom-labeled entities such as “smallpox” were no longer to be approached with superficial palliatives (e.g., bloodletting), but as infiltrating microbial agents in otherwise healthy individuals and, as further technical knowledge advanced, to be treated at their roots with appropriately targeted antibiotics.
An additional conceptual development in medical science occurred this past quarter of a century in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Never before had the immune system been known to play so vital a role in differentiating normal versus abnormal functioning. It has been illustrated recently, for example, that constitutional differences exist among individuals in their susceptibility to the immunodefi ciency virus; some are resistant to its effects whereas others will succumb to full-blown AIDS. Here again we may draw a parallel to our personological model from our sister science of medicine. Personality disorders may be seen as representing different vulnerabilities in people’s “psychic immune system,” that is, defects or defi ciencies in a person’s longstanding pattern of perceiving and coping with the psychic stressors in his or her mental life. The different personality disorders are signs of different psychic vulnerabilities. The task of personologists is to decode (diagnose) these vulnerabilities on the basis of a patient’s symptoms, and then engage in therapy that not only removes the symptoms but also works through the individual’s underlying vulnerabilities. Assessing and understanding the vulnerabilities—the patient’s weakened intrapsychic defenses, neurochemical imbalances, cognitive misinterpretations, and interpersonal diffi culties—will enable us to take steps to effect, with all these domains of vulnerability in focus, a synergisitic and “personalized therapy.”
The desire for and potential in personological unifi cation calls for at least one additional consideration. Again, the parallel between medicine and personology points to an issue often alluded to, but rarely addressed directly: On what basis should a unifying paradigm of a “personality” science be grounded? In our view, all basic or applied sciences (physics, engineering, personology) are expressions of common functions grounded and understood from the conceptual principles of evolution theory. All disciplines of science, once achieving suffi cient maturity, are natural outgrowths of, as well as demonstrations of, the operation of evolutionary processes. Formally structured, each of these sciences is composed of subject-relevant theories (e.g., particle physics, personology), component classified taxonomies (e.g., synaptic neurochemicals, International Classification of Diseases), operational measuring tools (e.g., cyclotrons, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI]), and, when required, efficacious instruments of effecting change (e.g., locomotives, cognitive therapy). As we see it, only when all four of the preceding elements that provide a structure to a science are articulated and coordinated can our assessment tools and our therapeutic techniques demonstrate or achieve full empirical validity and instrumental efficacy. Unfortunately, most of our theories and studies have existed largely as independent and often contradictory approaches to a modestly formed science; that is, they have little to no relationship to the assessment measures we employ to identify interventional targets, nor do they stem from explanatory principles of theories employed to understand the individuals who seek our clinical efforts. We lack the means found in subjects such as physics where physicists possess the ability to apply the equations of theory to their taxonomy of elementary particles and possess measurement instruments that can test whether theoretically generated properties exist in fact. It is our belief that we are reaching a time when we can begin to systematize our knowledge of personology in a manner akin to more advanced sciences. Specifically, it is our judgment that we would do well to employ the universal principles of evolutionary theory to guide our understanding of the properties of human functioning, that is, to enable us to formulate theoretical propositions that “explain” our subject domain. These principles should also enable us to construct a taxonomic system that is derived from such a theory, which, in turn, will facilitate the development of assessment tools that identify properties composing the taxonomy, and then point to those clinical characteristics that should serve as therapeutic targets. In effect, a unified personological
paradigm such as this will serve as an ever-present guide as to where, how, and which assessment tools and interventions are best employed. A few words should be said at the outset outlining the logic and steps we will follow as we proceed in this chapter. First, let us note that the ontological position of the personality prototypes is unchanging and invariant. They are derived by a series of direct and simple deductions from the evolutionary model, resting on what we believe to be the three fundamental and indispensable essentials of life: “existential survival” (pleasure/pain), ecological adaptation (active/passive), and species replication (propagation/nurturance). As an inevitable deduction, the several derived personality prototypes are the fi nal word, real and defi nitive, given that they neither change nor can be altered by the impact of such extrascientifi c conditions as social or political considerations. That the prevalence of prototypal personalities can and will vary as a function of cultural infl uences is both possible and expected, but their enduring and inextinguishable character, as derived from
the essentials of evolution, is immutable. Second, what is variable are what we refer to as personality subtypes. Personality subtypes are essentially combinations of the several immutable prototypes. The subtypes are not derived directly from the imperatives of evolution’s processes. They take shape as the adventitious impact of life’s experiences generate admixtures of composites of the prototypes, compounds, and blendings that result from the infl uence of familial and cultural forces. Also among these mosaic amalgamations are subtype variants that differ in their degree of “normality or abnormality.” Thus, the exigencies of evolution can sequentially and ultimately generate, in interaction with sociocultural experiences, several pure prototypes, numerous subtypes, and well as any number of levels of healthy and unhealthy multiforms. Third, there is a need to develop a schema of trait characteristics and associated quantitative tools by which we can differentiate and assess the personality types and subtypes. Numerous theories have been advanced from which selective trait features are highlighted; for example, those that give primacy to interpersonal relations, or cognitive beliefs, or intrapsychic processes, or neurologically based dispositions. Each of these is productive as a source of personological or clinical study. But, the singularity of their focus is severely limiting. We believe a trait format should incorporate and subsume all of these part function characteristics in an overarching schema of trait domains, e.g., interpersonal conduct, cognitive style, mood temperament. Similarly, mathematical efforts have been employed to deduce traits from covariant data sources, the most popular of these being several factorial procedures. As will be noted later, numerical procedures, in our judgment, of either a simple arithmetic character or a more complex algebraicformula, are likely to be a more productive methodological resource than factor analysis for assessing quantitative gauges of the several trait domains. These will be touched upon in later paragraphs as well.
We humans, understandingly, have subdivided nature’s intrinsic oneness into spheres of attention and focus in order to simplify our task of understanding it; hence, we have physics, chemistry, geology, and the like. In doing so, however, we have overlooked or bypassed those deeper and essential commonalities they share. As addressed in earlier books and articles of ours, we judge that principles of an evolutionary character underlie all of them, that is, laws and processes that all our man-made distinct sciences share in common. Though “discovered” initially in the biological sciences, evolution refl ects a set of natural laws applicable to both the physical and the psychological sciences. To us, these common rudiments and universal operations of nature also undergird our science’s study of the problems of persons, as well as the logic we should follow, when needed, to select the focus and modes for their treatment.
It is our view that much of psychological science remains adrift, obsessed with horizontal refi nements and passing fads, a patchwork quilt of dissonant concepts and methods, rather than a unifi ed tapestry that interweaves (unifi es) its components to these deeper fundamental and common principles of nature. Table 1.1 provides an outline of the fi ve components the senior author has articulated as a unifying paradigm for the subject dmains of personology and psychopathology. It recommends that these fields be grounded in evolutionary principles and be designed thereby to cohere the elements and functions that comprise a science of clinical psychology. To fail to build such a unifying paradigm of personology and psychopathology will keep us on the same unprogressive course that has plagued the fi eld since time immemorial. Brilliant theoretical ideas have been proposed in the past, articulate classifi cation systems and quantitatively sensitive assessment instruments have been generated, as well as imaginative therapies developed, but we remain stuck in a babble of confl ict and confusion in which little is synthesized or structured logically. Integrating the several prime components comprising a clinically oriented personological science, grounded in the generative paradigm provided by evolutionary principles, will provide an undergirding framework for integrative assessment and treatment interventions. It is a task worthy of collaborative efforts on our part.