ANDERSON – TWO ROUTES TO KNOWLEDGE
Anderson (1992) attempts the same synthesis as Detterman (that is, between low-level and high-level views of intelligence, and between general and specific abilities) but incorporates a developmental dimension. Anderson’s theory is also framed within a general theory of cognitive architecture proposed by Fodor (1983). Anderson’s theory of the minimal cognitive architecture underlying intelligence (minimal cognitive architecture.
Anderson’s model of intelligence
outlining two main contributors to the gaining of knowledge: speed of information processing and modular development) and development argues that intelligence tests measure intelligence by assessing knowledge, but that knowledge itself is acquired through two different routes, as proposed by Fodor. The major proposition is that these two processing routes are related to the two different dimensions of intelligence – one related to individual differences (viz Galton, Spearman and Jensen) and the other to cognitive development (viz Binet and Piaget).
Central processes of thought
Anderson suggests that the first route to knowledge is through thought (central processes - central processes Fodor’s term for the kinds of proposed information processing carried out in thought as distinct from those carried out by mental ‘modules’) and is related to differences in IQ.
Thoughtful problem solving
can be done either by verbalizing a problem (using language-like propositions to think) or by visualizing it (using visuo-spatial representations to think). For this to happen, we need two different kinds of knowledge acquisition routines, each generated by one of two specific processors. It is proposed that these processors are the source of individual differences in specific abilities, which, in turn, are constrained by the speed of a basic processing mechanism. So, at a slow processing speed, only the simplest kinds of thoughts of either kind can occur (It is argued that the speed of the basic processing mechanism can be measured using tasks such as inspection time and reaction time.). It is suggested by Anderson that this constraint is the basis of individual differences in general intelligence and the reason for manifest specific abilities being correlated (giving rise to the g factor).
Information-processing modules
The second route to knowledge is through dedicated information-processing modules, (modules dedicated informationprocessing systems that provide information about the environment (e.g. complex information conveyed by people’s faces) which cannot be provided by central processes of thought in an ecologically useful time frame) and it is argued by Anderson that this route is related to cognitive development. It is suggested that modules have evolved to provide information about the environment that cannot be provided by central processes of thought in an ecologically useful time frame. For example, if we had to ‘think through’ all the perceptual information presented to us in order to construct a three-dimensional view of the world, we would be literally lost in thought. Because this activity is so important to us and requires great computational power and speed, it is suggested by Anderson (building on Fodor) that evolution has created special modular devices to allow us to do this automatically. Other examples of likely modules are language acquisition devices, face recognition systems, and the core computational procedures involved in acquiring a theory of mind.
According to Anderson’s viewpoint, the maturation and acquisition of modules is the prime cause of developmental change. Because modules function independently of variations in the speed of the basic processing mechanism, their operation is independent of differences in IQ. This means that, according to Anderson, individual differences and cognitive development represent two independent dimensions of intelligence. It also means that these complex modular attributes are available to non-braindamaged individuals with intellectual disabilities. While evidence for, and application of, Anderson’s model is increasing (Anderson, 2001), a theory such as this is necessarily constrained by imperfections in the tasks (such as inspection time) used to measure the hypothetical, biological basis of speed of processing. Indeed others have suggested that inspection time, for example, is more related to specific visual processes than to general intelligence (Burns, Nettelbeck & White, 1998; Deary, 2000).
Anderson (1992) attempts the same synthesis as Detterman (that is, between low-level and high-level views of intelligence, and between general and specific abilities) but incorporates a developmental dimension. Anderson’s theory is also framed within a general theory of cognitive architecture proposed by Fodor (1983). Anderson’s theory of the minimal cognitive architecture underlying intelligence (minimal cognitive architecture.
Anderson’s model of intelligence
outlining two main contributors to the gaining of knowledge: speed of information processing and modular development) and development argues that intelligence tests measure intelligence by assessing knowledge, but that knowledge itself is acquired through two different routes, as proposed by Fodor. The major proposition is that these two processing routes are related to the two different dimensions of intelligence – one related to individual differences (viz Galton, Spearman and Jensen) and the other to cognitive development (viz Binet and Piaget).
Central processes of thought
Anderson suggests that the first route to knowledge is through thought (central processes - central processes Fodor’s term for the kinds of proposed information processing carried out in thought as distinct from those carried out by mental ‘modules’) and is related to differences in IQ.
Thoughtful problem solving
can be done either by verbalizing a problem (using language-like propositions to think) or by visualizing it (using visuo-spatial representations to think). For this to happen, we need two different kinds of knowledge acquisition routines, each generated by one of two specific processors. It is proposed that these processors are the source of individual differences in specific abilities, which, in turn, are constrained by the speed of a basic processing mechanism. So, at a slow processing speed, only the simplest kinds of thoughts of either kind can occur (It is argued that the speed of the basic processing mechanism can be measured using tasks such as inspection time and reaction time.). It is suggested by Anderson that this constraint is the basis of individual differences in general intelligence and the reason for manifest specific abilities being correlated (giving rise to the g factor).
Information-processing modules
The second route to knowledge is through dedicated information-processing modules, (modules dedicated informationprocessing systems that provide information about the environment (e.g. complex information conveyed by people’s faces) which cannot be provided by central processes of thought in an ecologically useful time frame) and it is argued by Anderson that this route is related to cognitive development. It is suggested that modules have evolved to provide information about the environment that cannot be provided by central processes of thought in an ecologically useful time frame. For example, if we had to ‘think through’ all the perceptual information presented to us in order to construct a three-dimensional view of the world, we would be literally lost in thought. Because this activity is so important to us and requires great computational power and speed, it is suggested by Anderson (building on Fodor) that evolution has created special modular devices to allow us to do this automatically. Other examples of likely modules are language acquisition devices, face recognition systems, and the core computational procedures involved in acquiring a theory of mind.
According to Anderson’s viewpoint, the maturation and acquisition of modules is the prime cause of developmental change. Because modules function independently of variations in the speed of the basic processing mechanism, their operation is independent of differences in IQ. This means that, according to Anderson, individual differences and cognitive development represent two independent dimensions of intelligence. It also means that these complex modular attributes are available to non-braindamaged individuals with intellectual disabilities. While evidence for, and application of, Anderson’s model is increasing (Anderson, 2001), a theory such as this is necessarily constrained by imperfections in the tasks (such as inspection time) used to measure the hypothetical, biological basis of speed of processing. Indeed others have suggested that inspection time, for example, is more related to specific visual processes than to general intelligence (Burns, Nettelbeck & White, 1998; Deary, 2000).
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