SAVANT SYNDROME
Savants (formerly known as idiots savants) are individuals with measured IQ in the mentally retarded range who, nevertheless, display a single and exceptional cognitive ability. For example, they might be able to calculate what day of the week any named calender date falls on (O’Connor & Hermelin, 1984). They might display high musical ability (Sloboda, Hermelin & O’Connor 1985) or artistic talent (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). Or they might be unusually skilled at learning foreign languages (Smith & Tsimpli, 1995) or factoring numbers (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). How are such feats possible if the general intelligence of these individuals is in the retarded range? The memory explanation An early view of savant skills was that they are based on an exceptionally good but essentially unorganized rote memory system and/or extensive practice (Hill, 1978; Horwitz et al., 1965). More recently, it has been suggested that many savant skills can be explained in terms of an extensive but generative (rather than passive) emory for domain relevant material (Nettelbeck, 1999; Nettelbeck & Young, 1996; Young & Nettelbeck, 1994). There are some problems with the memory explanation of all savant abilities, though. O’Connor and Hermelin (1984, 1992), for example, found that calendrical calculators (those who can calculate what day a particular date falls on) can name days for dates for which no calender yet exists. They also use abstract rules and structures governing the calendar in order to perform their calculations (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1986). The memory explanation also seems an unlikely basis for artistic talent and for some other calculating abilities, such as the prime number calculating individual investigated by O’Connor and colleagues (Anderson, O’Connor & Hermelin, 1999; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). On the other hand, if savants’ feats are accomplished using some kind of automatic or non-thoughtful processing (automatic long-term memory retrieval is the classic example of this), there is no inherent contradiction with the notion of g. However, it should be noted that there have even been suggestions of specific forms of memory deficits in autism (see Shalom, 2003, for a recent review). Detterman (1996) does argue that savants falsify the idea that there is a single and common ability underlying all intellectual task performance. In so doing, Detterman takes a similar line to that advocated by Gardner (1983), namely that savants prove the fundamental independence of the component abilities that ‘normally’ make up g. Yet this feels just a little too easy. For one thing, the abilities that savants display are somewhat implausible candidates as the ‘component abilities’ of Detterman’s theory. After all, savant skills represent rich, high-level abilities in themselves, not the basic procedures of information processing described by Detterman. Moreover, recent research with calendrical calculators has found that they are not talented mathematicians (although some have adequate mathematical ability), which challenges one of the m in tenets for Gardner-like models of multiple intelligences (Cowan, O’Connor & Samella, 2003). The modular explanation Anderson’s theory of the minimal cognitive architecture assumes that the brain damage that leads to savant syndrome has selectively spared some modules from the generalized brain damage that has led to mental retardation in these individuals. It is proposed that these modules come in three kinds:
Mark I modules are the full blown innate variety that most plausibly underlie savant talents in art, music and language.
They are represented by all but one of the modules.
Mark II modules are the fetch-and-carry mechanisms of cognitive processing, such as long-term memory retrieval, or the ability to recognize mental representations that forms the basis of the ‘theory of mind’ mechanism (Leslie, 1987).
Mark III modules are associative processes established after extensive practice, and they are not explicitly.
According to Anderson, because savant abilities are modular there is no paradox in their existence in individuals with low IQ, which is a property of thoughtful processing. Frith (2003), Smith and Tsimpli (1995) and others have presented this model as the best fit for explaining observations of savant syndrome.
Savants (formerly known as idiots savants) are individuals with measured IQ in the mentally retarded range who, nevertheless, display a single and exceptional cognitive ability. For example, they might be able to calculate what day of the week any named calender date falls on (O’Connor & Hermelin, 1984). They might display high musical ability (Sloboda, Hermelin & O’Connor 1985) or artistic talent (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). Or they might be unusually skilled at learning foreign languages (Smith & Tsimpli, 1995) or factoring numbers (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). How are such feats possible if the general intelligence of these individuals is in the retarded range? The memory explanation An early view of savant skills was that they are based on an exceptionally good but essentially unorganized rote memory system and/or extensive practice (Hill, 1978; Horwitz et al., 1965). More recently, it has been suggested that many savant skills can be explained in terms of an extensive but generative (rather than passive) emory for domain relevant material (Nettelbeck, 1999; Nettelbeck & Young, 1996; Young & Nettelbeck, 1994). There are some problems with the memory explanation of all savant abilities, though. O’Connor and Hermelin (1984, 1992), for example, found that calendrical calculators (those who can calculate what day a particular date falls on) can name days for dates for which no calender yet exists. They also use abstract rules and structures governing the calendar in order to perform their calculations (Hermelin & O’Connor, 1986). The memory explanation also seems an unlikely basis for artistic talent and for some other calculating abilities, such as the prime number calculating individual investigated by O’Connor and colleagues (Anderson, O’Connor & Hermelin, 1999; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1990). On the other hand, if savants’ feats are accomplished using some kind of automatic or non-thoughtful processing (automatic long-term memory retrieval is the classic example of this), there is no inherent contradiction with the notion of g. However, it should be noted that there have even been suggestions of specific forms of memory deficits in autism (see Shalom, 2003, for a recent review). Detterman (1996) does argue that savants falsify the idea that there is a single and common ability underlying all intellectual task performance. In so doing, Detterman takes a similar line to that advocated by Gardner (1983), namely that savants prove the fundamental independence of the component abilities that ‘normally’ make up g. Yet this feels just a little too easy. For one thing, the abilities that savants display are somewhat implausible candidates as the ‘component abilities’ of Detterman’s theory. After all, savant skills represent rich, high-level abilities in themselves, not the basic procedures of information processing described by Detterman. Moreover, recent research with calendrical calculators has found that they are not talented mathematicians (although some have adequate mathematical ability), which challenges one of the m in tenets for Gardner-like models of multiple intelligences (Cowan, O’Connor & Samella, 2003). The modular explanation Anderson’s theory of the minimal cognitive architecture assumes that the brain damage that leads to savant syndrome has selectively spared some modules from the generalized brain damage that has led to mental retardation in these individuals. It is proposed that these modules come in three kinds:
Mark I modules are the full blown innate variety that most plausibly underlie savant talents in art, music and language.
They are represented by all but one of the modules.
Mark II modules are the fetch-and-carry mechanisms of cognitive processing, such as long-term memory retrieval, or the ability to recognize mental representations that forms the basis of the ‘theory of mind’ mechanism (Leslie, 1987).
Mark III modules are associative processes established after extensive practice, and they are not explicitly.
According to Anderson, because savant abilities are modular there is no paradox in their existence in individuals with low IQ, which is a property of thoughtful processing. Frith (2003), Smith and Tsimpli (1995) and others have presented this model as the best fit for explaining observations of savant syndrome.
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