In recent years, research into emotion and cognition has positively exploded, coming to dominate the field, although it remains a controversial approach to the psychology of Linking arousal and cognition Schachter (1964, 1970) put forward a two-factor theory that had a profound influence on the way that psychologists think about emotion. Briefly, he argued that a necessary part of emotion is arousal of the sympathetic nervous system. The intensity of such arousal differs from situation to situation, and, according to Schachter, is interpreted according to our beliefs and/or knowledge about the situation. This means that our experience of emotion depends on two factors – physiological arousal and cognition.
Schachter derived three empirical predictions from his theory, which he tested in a cunningly devised experiment (Schachter & Singer, 1962). This work, conducted over 40 years ago, has provided the impetus for research on the relationship between emotion and cognition that continues up to the present day. Schachter’s work was partly based on a study by Maranon (1924), who had injected 120 patients with epinephrine (adrenaline) and asked them to say what it made them feel like. Adrenaline causes changes in sympathetic arousal reflected in rises in heart rate and blood pressure, respiration and blood sugar. Subjectively, this takes the form of palpitations, tremors, flushing, faster breathing, and so on. About 70 per cent of Maranon’s patients reported only physical effects while the other 30 per cent also mentioned emotional effects. Typically, participants in the latter group said that the injection made them feel ‘as if ’ they were afraid, rather than actually feeling afraid. Schachter (1959) believed that an epinephrine injection would produce a state of arousal that people would evaluate in terms of whatever they perceived around them, if they were unaware of the effects to expect from the injection. He made three propositions that, between them, show the necessity of both cognition and arousal to emotion:
1. If we are in a physiologically aroused state for which there is no obvious explanation, then we will label it by using whatever cognitions are available to us. The same state might be labelled in many different ways.
2. If we are in a physiologically aroused state for which the explanation is obvious, then we will not seek further explanations.
3. For emotion to occur, there must be physiological arousal.
To test these propositions, Schachter and Singer (1962) persuaded participants to agree to an injection of a ‘vitamin’ so that its effects on vision could be determined. In fact, they were injected either with epinephrine or a placebo (saline). For ethical reasons, participants would nowadays be debriefed after the completion of such a study concerning the misinformation they had received.
Participants were then given one of three ‘explanations’ of the effects of the injection. Epinephrine-informed participants were told that the ‘vitamin’ might have side effects lasting for about 20 minutes. The effects described to them were the actual effects of epinephrine. Epinephrine-ignorant participants were told that the injections would have no side effects. Epinephrine-misinformed participants were told to expect impossible side effects, such as numb feet, body itches and headaches. There was also a control group, injected with saline, which had the same instructions as the epinephrine-ignorant group. Following the injection, individual participants were taken to wait in a room with another person whom they believed was another participant, although it was, in fact, a confederate of the experimenters. For some participants, the room was a mess and the confederate was friendly and extraverted (‘euphoric’ condition). The remaining participants and the confederate were in a different room (the ‘anger’ condition), and they had personal and somewhat insulting questionnaires to complete. The confederate became steadily more angry with this and eventually stormed out (‘anger’ condition). Participants were observed through one-way mirrors and were given self-report questionnaires afterwards, the major questions concerning how angry or irritated, or how good or happy, they felt. In the euphoric condition, the epinephrine-misinformed or epinephrine-ignorant participants rated themselves as being significantly more euphoric than the epinephrine-informed participants.
The placebo control participants were less euphoric than either the misinformed or ignorant groups, but more euphoric than the informed group, although these differences were not significant. The epinephrine-misinformed and epinephrine-ignorant participants had no good explanation for their bodily state. Similarly, in the anger condition, epinephrine-ignorant participants were significantly angrier than the epinephrine informed, with no differences between controls and the misinformed or ignorant groups. In this ingenious experiment, Schachter and Singer were convinced that they had supported Schachter’s three propositions by manipulating cognition and arousal. Schachter’s (1970) general conclusions were that there is little physiological differentiation between the emotions, the labelling of emotional states being largely a cognitive matter. Even though both Schachter’s ideas and his studies have been influential, they have also been criticized (see Cotton, 1981; Izard, 1972; Leventhal, 1974; Plutchik & Ax, 1967; Reisenzein, 1983). To take one example, Schachter did not prove that emotion depends on physiological arousal and cognition. It may be possible to induce physiological arousal through cognition, or to produce a sort of physiological tranquillization cognitively. For example, it is possible to speed up or slow down heart rate and respiration simply by imagining playing a vigorous sport or by visualizing a tranquil scene.
Leventhal (1974) goes further, arguing that Schachter has never shown exactly how arousal and cognition combine in emotion, particularly in children. From a Schachterian perspective, how would a young child be able to feel any emotion before knowing the linguistic label for that feeling? In the end, although Schachter’s ideas have not been disproved, neither have they stood up robustly to criticism. At present, it is reasonable to conclude that feedback from physiological arousal can directly intensify emotional states. Moreover, the arousal–emotion link is mediated, or at least affected, by causal attributions, or appraisals (see chapter 17), about the source of the arousal. Whether both physiological arousal and cognition are necessary for the perception of emotion remains an open question.
[Stanley Schachter (1922–97), an innovator in the 1960s, more than anyone else succeeded in introducing significant ideas emanating from the ‘cognitive revolution’ into the area of emotion. His influence has continued to the present day, especially regarding the reciprocal influence of emotion and cognition, and the particular significance of attribution. His ingenious study with Singer began many years of exploration into the relationship between physiological arousal and cognitions (especially appraisals) in the psychology of emotion. His general conclusions were that there is little physiological differentiation between different emotions, the labelling of emotional states being largely a cognitive matter. These conclusions have been vigorously challenged but his influence in the field remains.]
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