CATEGORIZATION AND STEREOTYPING
Before we can apply a schema to a social object, we have to categorize (or label) it as something – a book, a tree, an animal, or whatever. In other words, we identify objects, people and events as members of a category, similar to others in that category anddifferent from members of other categories. Mostly we employ categories automatically and with little conscious effort. Categories help to impose order on the stimulus world, and are fundamental to perception, thought, language and action (Lakoff, 1987; Research on categorization stems from the pioneering work of cognitive scientist Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, 1975; 1978). Models for social categorization.
The categorization of social objects, people and events is assumed to be a more complex process than categorization of inanimate objects because social objects are variable, dynamic and interactive. Nevertheless, members of a social category share common features. Some instances contained in the category are considered to be more typical than others – the most typical, or prototypical, representing the category as a whole. The more features an instance shares with other category members, the more quickly and confidently it is identified as a member. For example, you may quickly decide that Sue is a prototypical politician because she is publicity seeking, charming, cunning and ambitious, whereas Paul, who is shy, indecisive, and avoids publicity would be considered atypical of the category ‘politician’. In contrast to the prototype model, an exemplar-based model suggests that categories are represented by specific and concrete instances (exemplars) of the category (Smith & Zarate 1992). For example, arriving at an abstracted average of two very different politicians, such as Bill Clinton and Margaret Thatcher, may be too cognitively demanding. These extreme instances may be better represented as concrete exemplars within an overall general category of ‘politician’. People may rely on a combination of prototype and exemplarbased models, depending on the social objects in question and the conditions under which the information is processed (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Hierarchichal structure of categories Categories are hierarchically structured, with more abstract and general categories of information at the top of a pyramid structure and more specific categories at the bottom. Information can be processed at different levels of abstraction, moving from a concrete specific instance to a more general level of inference. Like natural object categories, social stereotypes can be differentiated into lower-order sub-categories, or sub-types (Fiske, 1998). For example, a super-ordinate category (such as ‘woman’) may comprise a number of sub-types (such as career woman, housewife and feminist). Listing the prototypical features of these category sub-types is considerably easier, as they contain more detailed information than broader and more abstract super-ordinate categories (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). Brewer, Dull and Lui (1981) found this to be the case with young people’s representations of the elderly. The ‘elderly’ category was differentiated further into three elderly sub-types – the senior citizen, the elderly statesman and the grandmotherly type. In turn, each of these sub-types was associated with distinctive characteristics and traits.
Before we can apply a schema to a social object, we have to categorize (or label) it as something – a book, a tree, an animal, or whatever. In other words, we identify objects, people and events as members of a category, similar to others in that category anddifferent from members of other categories. Mostly we employ categories automatically and with little conscious effort. Categories help to impose order on the stimulus world, and are fundamental to perception, thought, language and action (Lakoff, 1987; Research on categorization stems from the pioneering work of cognitive scientist Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, 1975; 1978). Models for social categorization.
The categorization of social objects, people and events is assumed to be a more complex process than categorization of inanimate objects because social objects are variable, dynamic and interactive. Nevertheless, members of a social category share common features. Some instances contained in the category are considered to be more typical than others – the most typical, or prototypical, representing the category as a whole. The more features an instance shares with other category members, the more quickly and confidently it is identified as a member. For example, you may quickly decide that Sue is a prototypical politician because she is publicity seeking, charming, cunning and ambitious, whereas Paul, who is shy, indecisive, and avoids publicity would be considered atypical of the category ‘politician’. In contrast to the prototype model, an exemplar-based model suggests that categories are represented by specific and concrete instances (exemplars) of the category (Smith & Zarate 1992). For example, arriving at an abstracted average of two very different politicians, such as Bill Clinton and Margaret Thatcher, may be too cognitively demanding. These extreme instances may be better represented as concrete exemplars within an overall general category of ‘politician’. People may rely on a combination of prototype and exemplarbased models, depending on the social objects in question and the conditions under which the information is processed (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Hierarchichal structure of categories Categories are hierarchically structured, with more abstract and general categories of information at the top of a pyramid structure and more specific categories at the bottom. Information can be processed at different levels of abstraction, moving from a concrete specific instance to a more general level of inference. Like natural object categories, social stereotypes can be differentiated into lower-order sub-categories, or sub-types (Fiske, 1998). For example, a super-ordinate category (such as ‘woman’) may comprise a number of sub-types (such as career woman, housewife and feminist). Listing the prototypical features of these category sub-types is considerably easier, as they contain more detailed information than broader and more abstract super-ordinate categories (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). Brewer, Dull and Lui (1981) found this to be the case with young people’s representations of the elderly. The ‘elderly’ category was differentiated further into three elderly sub-types – the senior citizen, the elderly statesman and the grandmotherly type. In turn, each of these sub-types was associated with distinctive characteristics and traits.
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