THE POWER OF STEREOTYPES
In our discussion of attribution theory, we argued that attributions are not only internal cognitive phenomena but also social and cultural explanations shaped by widely shared representations within a society, community or group. The same can be said for schemas, categories and stereotypes. While these have been largely discussed as cognitive constructs, it is important to recognize that they are also essentially cultural and social in nature, i.e. cultural knowledge that is determined by dominant and consensual representations learned by members of a society. Because they are acquired early in life, widely shared and pervasive, stereotypes of groups are more than just ‘pictures in our heads’. They are socially and discursively reproduced in the course of everyday communication (Augoustinos & Walker, 1998). They are also ideological in nature, because they are often used to rationalize and justify why some groups are more powerful and more dominant than others ( Jost & Banaji, 1994). So social stereotypes can be used as political weapons to justify existing group inequalities, gender stereotypes have been used to justify gender inequalities, and race stereotypes have been used to justify racism and prejudice. Other approaches in social psychology, such as social representations theory (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), regard social categories and stereotypes very differently from the predominantly cognitiveand information-processin g account we have outlined above. Rather than energy-saving devices that facilitate cognition by simplifying reality, stereotypes (and the social categories on which they are based) are viewed within these contrasting frameworks as rich in symbolic meaning, and as being used to make sense of the power and status relations between different social groups (Oakes et al., 1994: Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994).
In our discussion of attribution theory, we argued that attributions are not only internal cognitive phenomena but also social and cultural explanations shaped by widely shared representations within a society, community or group. The same can be said for schemas, categories and stereotypes. While these have been largely discussed as cognitive constructs, it is important to recognize that they are also essentially cultural and social in nature, i.e. cultural knowledge that is determined by dominant and consensual representations learned by members of a society. Because they are acquired early in life, widely shared and pervasive, stereotypes of groups are more than just ‘pictures in our heads’. They are socially and discursively reproduced in the course of everyday communication (Augoustinos & Walker, 1998). They are also ideological in nature, because they are often used to rationalize and justify why some groups are more powerful and more dominant than others ( Jost & Banaji, 1994). So social stereotypes can be used as political weapons to justify existing group inequalities, gender stereotypes have been used to justify gender inequalities, and race stereotypes have been used to justify racism and prejudice. Other approaches in social psychology, such as social representations theory (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995), social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), regard social categories and stereotypes very differently from the predominantly cognitiveand information-processin g account we have outlined above. Rather than energy-saving devices that facilitate cognition by simplifying reality, stereotypes (and the social categories on which they are based) are viewed within these contrasting frameworks as rich in symbolic meaning, and as being used to make sense of the power and status relations between different social groups (Oakes et al., 1994: Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994).
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