RECENT RESEARCH INTO SOCIAL PROCESSING
The continuum model of processing
We have seen how our preconceptions and prejudices can lead to biases and distortions. But we don’t always behave like cognitive misers. By contrast, in certain situations we engage in a careful and piecemeal analysis of the ‘data’. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) proposed that the processing of social information is a kind of continuum, as we move from schema or category- based processing to more piecemeal data-based processing 17). These authors propose that we use category-based processing when the data are unambiguous and relatively unimportant to us and piecemeal processing when the data are ambiguous, relatively important, and the need for accuracy is high. For example, the time and effort we spend forming impressions of others depends on their relative importance to us and on our motivations for getting to know them. Everyday superficial encounters are usually based on people’s salient social group memberships, such as gender, race, age and occupation. These social categories access for us an associated range of expectations that are usually stereotypical. If we are motivated to move beyond this category-based processing, we take a more piecemeal and data-driven approach.
Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of processing has led to a significant revision of the cognitive miser model that characterized the approach to social cognition in the 1980s. More recent research has demonstrated that perceivers are more like motivated tacticians (Fiske, 1992; 1998), using processing strategies that are consistent with their motivations, goals and situational requirements. Automatic vs. controlled processing While processing can take place anywhere along the continuum just described, most person impressions seem to be first and foremost category-based (this kind of schematic processing apparently being the ‘default option’). This is why so much recent attention has focused on the primacy and importance of stereotypes in perception.
In-depth processing requires controlled attention, intention and effort, whereas it appears that category-based perception can occur automatically and beyond conscious awareness (Bargh, 1994; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). This distinction between automatic and controlled processing was applied by Devine (1989) to the activation of stereotypes. Devine argues that most people, through socialization, acquire knowledge of social stereotypes early in childhood and that, through repeated exposure, stereotypes of salient social groups become well-learned knowledge structures that are automatically activated without deliberate thinking. This model suggests that this unintentional activation of the stereotype is equally strong for high and low prejudiced people.For example, Devine (1989) found that the activation of a negative stereotype associated with African Americans (‘hostile’) occurred for both high and low prejudiced participants when stereotypic primes were presented subliminally (beyond conscious awareness). So when people do not have the opportunity to consciously monitor and appraise information, the ability to suppress the stereotype becomes difficult, even for unprejudiced people. This, of course, suggests that stereotyping may be inevitable, and in some situations difficult to control. Given that stereotyping is usually linked to prejudice and discrimination, it paints a rather bleak picture for intergroup relations. But Devine argues that, while stereotypes can be automatically activated, what distinguishes low prejudiced from high prejudiced people is the conscious development of personal beliefs that challenge the stereotype. These egalitarian beliefs are deployed during conscious processing, and are able to override the automatically activated stereotype. In contrast, people high in prejudice have personal beliefs that are congruent with negative stereotypes, so during conscious processing they need not control or inhibit the automatically activated stereotype. While several studies now support Devine’s claim that stereotypes of salient social groups are widely known and shared, there is less support for the claim that stereotypes are automatically activated equally for everyone, regardless of their prejudice levels (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke, MacLeod & Walker, 1994). For example, Locke et al. (1994) found that the predominantly negative stereotype of Australian Aboriginal people was only activated in people high in prejudice.Similarly, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that only highly prejudiced respondents activated the negative stereotype of African- Caribbean people in Britain. So, according to these studies, it seems that stereotypes are not activated to the same extent for all people, and are therefore not necessarily inevitable. Rather, people’s attitudes and values – in this case, low levels of prejudice – inhibit and constrain the activation of stereotypes, not only consciously, but also unconsciously
The continuum model of processing
We have seen how our preconceptions and prejudices can lead to biases and distortions. But we don’t always behave like cognitive misers. By contrast, in certain situations we engage in a careful and piecemeal analysis of the ‘data’. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) proposed that the processing of social information is a kind of continuum, as we move from schema or category- based processing to more piecemeal data-based processing 17). These authors propose that we use category-based processing when the data are unambiguous and relatively unimportant to us and piecemeal processing when the data are ambiguous, relatively important, and the need for accuracy is high. For example, the time and effort we spend forming impressions of others depends on their relative importance to us and on our motivations for getting to know them. Everyday superficial encounters are usually based on people’s salient social group memberships, such as gender, race, age and occupation. These social categories access for us an associated range of expectations that are usually stereotypical. If we are motivated to move beyond this category-based processing, we take a more piecemeal and data-driven approach.
Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of processing has led to a significant revision of the cognitive miser model that characterized the approach to social cognition in the 1980s. More recent research has demonstrated that perceivers are more like motivated tacticians (Fiske, 1992; 1998), using processing strategies that are consistent with their motivations, goals and situational requirements. Automatic vs. controlled processing While processing can take place anywhere along the continuum just described, most person impressions seem to be first and foremost category-based (this kind of schematic processing apparently being the ‘default option’). This is why so much recent attention has focused on the primacy and importance of stereotypes in perception.
In-depth processing requires controlled attention, intention and effort, whereas it appears that category-based perception can occur automatically and beyond conscious awareness (Bargh, 1994; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). This distinction between automatic and controlled processing was applied by Devine (1989) to the activation of stereotypes. Devine argues that most people, through socialization, acquire knowledge of social stereotypes early in childhood and that, through repeated exposure, stereotypes of salient social groups become well-learned knowledge structures that are automatically activated without deliberate thinking. This model suggests that this unintentional activation of the stereotype is equally strong for high and low prejudiced people.For example, Devine (1989) found that the activation of a negative stereotype associated with African Americans (‘hostile’) occurred for both high and low prejudiced participants when stereotypic primes were presented subliminally (beyond conscious awareness). So when people do not have the opportunity to consciously monitor and appraise information, the ability to suppress the stereotype becomes difficult, even for unprejudiced people. This, of course, suggests that stereotyping may be inevitable, and in some situations difficult to control. Given that stereotyping is usually linked to prejudice and discrimination, it paints a rather bleak picture for intergroup relations. But Devine argues that, while stereotypes can be automatically activated, what distinguishes low prejudiced from high prejudiced people is the conscious development of personal beliefs that challenge the stereotype. These egalitarian beliefs are deployed during conscious processing, and are able to override the automatically activated stereotype. In contrast, people high in prejudice have personal beliefs that are congruent with negative stereotypes, so during conscious processing they need not control or inhibit the automatically activated stereotype. While several studies now support Devine’s claim that stereotypes of salient social groups are widely known and shared, there is less support for the claim that stereotypes are automatically activated equally for everyone, regardless of their prejudice levels (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke, MacLeod & Walker, 1994). For example, Locke et al. (1994) found that the predominantly negative stereotype of Australian Aboriginal people was only activated in people high in prejudice.Similarly, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that only highly prejudiced respondents activated the negative stereotype of African- Caribbean people in Britain. So, according to these studies, it seems that stereotypes are not activated to the same extent for all people, and are therefore not necessarily inevitable. Rather, people’s attitudes and values – in this case, low levels of prejudice – inhibit and constrain the activation of stereotypes, not only consciously, but also unconsciously
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