LANGUAGE AND COGNITION

LANGUAGE AND COGNITION

Our use of language in a wide variety of cognitive tasks raises the following important question: What influences does language have over other cognitive processes? Two extreme positions exist: (a) Language and other cognitive processes operate completely independently, and (b) language and other cognitive processes are completely related, with one determining the other. Between the extremes is a broad middle ground, where language and other cognitive processes are seen as related in some ways but independent in others.

The relationship between language and thought has been heavily debated. In the early days of American psychology, John B. Watson (1930) asserted that thought was language and nothing more. In particular, he rejected the idea that thought (internal mental representation or other cognitive activity) could occur without some sort of conditioned language responses occurring. Watson believed that all apparent instances of thinking (such as mentally computing sums, daydreaming about a vacation, weighing the pros and cons of a plan) were really the results of subvocal speech. Thinking was equated with talking to yourself, even if so quietly and covertly that no one (including you) knew you were using language.

Smith, Brown, Toman, and Goodman (1947) conducted a heroic experiment to test Watson’s theory. Smith served as the subject and allowed himself to be injected with a curare derivative, which paralyzed all his muscles, necessitating the use of an artificial respirator for the duration of the experiment. Because he could not move any muscles, he could not engage in subvocal speech. The question was, Would this also prevent him from other kinds of cognitive activity? The answer was a decisive no. Smith reported remembering and thinking about events that took place while under curare. Apparently, then, subvocal speech and thought are not equivalent.